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ABSTRACT—To prevent inflated property tax bills, the Michigan 
Constitution prohibits property tax assessments from exceeding 50% of a 
property’s market value. Between 2009 and 2015, the City of Detroit 
assessed 55%–85% of its residential properties in violation of the Michigan 
Constitution, and these unconstitutional assessments have had dire 
consequences. Between 2011 and 2015, one in four Detroit properties have 
been foreclosed upon for nonpayment of illegally inflated property taxes. In 
addition to Detroit, the other two cities in Michigan’s Wayne County where 
African-Americans comprise 70% or more of the population—Highland 
Park and Inkster—have similarly experienced systemic unconstitutional 
assessments and unprecedented property tax foreclosure rates. This Essay 
explores whether property tax administration policies in Wayne County 
disparately impact African-Americans in violation of the Fair Housing Act. 
I find that unconstitutional assessments and property tax foreclosures occur 
at a significantly higher rate in Wayne County’s predominately African-
American cities than in its predominately white ones. More importantly, the 
county’s property tax equalization policy has failed to correct these 
disparities, leading to a violation of the Fair Housing Act. Unjust property 
tax administration was frequently used to dispossess African-Americans of 
their lands and other property during the Jim Crow era. Although the motives 
may be different, this deplorable form of institutional racism is resurgent in 
Michigan. 
 
AUTHOR—Professor of Law, IIT, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Research 
Professor, American Bar Foundation; Damon J. Keith Distinguished Visiting 
Professor, Wayne State Law School; and Senior Research Scholar, 
University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Robert Schwemm, 
Jamie Crook, Christopher Berry, Lee Fennell, and Christopher Schmidt for 
providing extremely helpful, in-depth comments that allowed me to improve 
the Essay. I am grateful for the feedback I received at the Property Works in 
Progress Conference. Eric Seymour, Bartek Woda, and Brendan Sawyer 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1502 
provided exceptional research assistance. The National Science Foundation 
funded this research. 
 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1502 
I. PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION IN WAYNE COUNTY ..................................... 1507 
A. A Primer on Property Tax Calculations in Michigan.............................. 1507 
B. From Assessment to Foreclosure: The Underpinnings of the Property 
Tax Foreclosure Crisis in Detroit .......................................................... 1510 
II. FAIR HOUSING ACT (FHA) ............................................................................ 1515 
A. FHA’s Applicability to Property Tax Administration .............................. 1518 
B. FHA’s Disparate Impact Analysis ......................................................... 1527 
C. Analyzing Unconstitutional Tax Assessments Under §§ 3604 and 3605 
of the FHA ........................................................................................... 1536 
D. Litigating Unconstitutional Property Tax Assessments Under the FHA ... 1541 
III. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 1543 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 1547 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 1553 
APPENDIX ............................................................................................................ 1554 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Mrs. B is an African-American woman with a short, sassy haircut and 
a feisty disposition to match. She was born and raised in Detroit, Michigan, 
where she and her husband are now raising their seven children. Many 
Detroit residents have fled to surrounding suburbs as a result of Detroit’s 
slow economic decline, which began with the dramatic loss of manufacturing 
jobs in America’s auto industry and concluded with the largest municipal 
bankruptcy in U.S. history. Undeterred, Mrs. B, her family, and many others 
like them stayed and braced themselves through the hard times because they 
did not want to leave their beloved city. But, now that the city is experiencing 
economic resurgence, city officials are kicking people like Mrs. B out of their 
homes. 
In 2012, Mrs. B and her family were finally able to savor their very own 
sumptuous slice of the American Dream. After battling economic insecurity 
for decades, Mrs. B and her husband saved enough money to purchase their 
first home for $20,000 through a land contract from a company called Dream 
Homes Ventures.1 They put $5,000 down and made monthly payments of 
 
 1 In a land contract, the seller finances the sale instead of the bank, and buyers pay monthly 
installments, similar to rent. Unlike a traditional rental contract, buyers give the sellers a down payment, 
assume responsibility for all repairs, and are not safeguarded by the warranty of habitability or any other 
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$500. According to the land contract, property taxes and water were included 
in the monthly payment,2 but Dream Home Ventures did not, in fact, pay the 
taxes. In 2014, Mrs. B received a letter from the Wayne County Treasurer 
stating that they owed $9,000 in taxes accrued from 2010 to 2014. 
To make matters worse, the property tax bill was illegally high. 
Michigan’s constitution, legislation, and supporting case law clearly state 
that local authorities cannot assess properties at more than 50% of their 
market value.3 The Detroit assessor claimed Mrs. B’s home was worth about 
$46,000,4 although she purchased it for $20,000 in an open market 
transaction and other homes in her neighborhood sold for approximately that 
much money. The overinflated property tax assessments led to illegally high 
property tax bills.5 Although Mrs. B repeatedly said that, in Detroit, “our 
taxes are too damn high,” she did not know that she could appeal her taxes 
to gain relief. She was unable to pay the inflated property tax bill, so in 2015, 
 
legal doctrine that protects consumers from low-quality housing unfit for habitation. Michigan law does 
not require land contract sellers to have homes appraised or to disclose debts or liens on the property, and 
this lack of regulation leaves Detroiters vulnerable to predatory sellers who target low information, first-
time homebuyers. See Joel Kurth, Loose Regulations Make Land Contracts a Tool to Exploit Low-Income 
Homeowners, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (published May 20, 2017, 10:13 PM; updated May 24, 2017), 
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170521/NEWS/170529985/loose-regulations-make-land-
contracts-a-tool-to-exploit-low-income [https://perma.cc/B2JJ-U73A] (noting absence of any Michigan 
law requiring land contract sellers to disclose debts and liens or have homes appraised before sales). 
 2 Research shows that people pay more attention to their property taxes and are more likely to protest 
inequality when they pay their taxes directly to the state as opposed to a bank paying the property taxes 
on their behalf through an escrow account or some other mechanism. See Andrew T. Hayahsi, The Legal 
Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443, 1443 (2014) (“I find that reducing property tax salience 
makes homeowners less likely to appeal their property-value assessments, making it more likely that 
homeowners will remain overassessed and overtaxed. These overtaxed homeowners never perceive—are 
never able to ‘name’—their injury and consequently never obtain the relief to which they might be 
entitled. Moreover, I show that the selective use of appeals caused by legal salience shifts the tax burden 
to racial minorities, immigrants, and working families with children.”). 
 3 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27a(1) (2018); C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Mich. State 
Tax Comm’n, 221 N.W.2d 588, 591–92 (Mich. 1974); see also Great Lakes Div. of Nat’l Steel Corp. v. 
City of Ecorse, 576 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“True cash value is synonymous with fair 
market value.”). To determine the market value of residential properties, the local assessor analyzes recent 
sales of comparable properties. See INT’L ASSOC. OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON MASS 
APPRAISAL OF REAL PROPERTY 9 (2013), https://www.iaao.org/media/standards/MARP_2013. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/HCW9-SX82]. 
 4 Which in 2015 amounted to a State Equalized Value (SEV) of $22,838. See MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 211.27a(1) (2018). 
 5 Michigan authorities calculate property tax bills by multiplying the assessed value of a property 
(minus any exemptions) by the property tax rate. See MICH. LEGISLATURE, MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S 
GUIDE 2016: REFERENCE FOR THE 2015 TAX YEAR 1–4 (2016), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/
publications/TaxpayerGuide2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL8X-23QD] [hereinafter MICHIGAN 
TAXPAYER’S GUIDE] (describing method for calculating tax and some exemptions). If the assessed values 
of homes are too high, then the resulting property tax bills will also be inflated. 
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Wayne County foreclosed, gained title to Mrs. B’s home, and sold it at 
auction for $500. 
The most heartbreaking part of the story is that Mrs. B and her family 
live under the federal poverty threshold and hence qualify for the Poverty 
Tax Exemption, which means that they were not supposed to be paying the 
property taxes that led to their eviction in the first place. But, due to poor 
advertising and several unnecessary hurdles erected by the City of Detroit, 
Mrs. B and her husband were not aware of the exemption.6 
In prior work, I investigated property tax injustice in the City of Detroit, 
which is located in Michigan’s Wayne County.7 I found that, between 2009 
and 2015, the City of Detroit assessed 55%–85% of its residential properties 
at over 50% of their market values in violation of the Michigan Constitution.8 
Due to the resulting illegally inflated property tax bills that Mrs. B and many 
other Detroit homeowners could not afford to pay, between 2011 and 2015, 
the Wayne County treasurer foreclosed upon one in four of all homes in 
Detroit for nonpayment of property taxes.9 One of the last times that 
Americans witnessed this accelerated rate of property tax foreclosures was 
during the Great Depression.10 
There have been several attempts to hold authorities accountable for 
this monumental property tax injustice, including a class action lawsuit filed 
on July 13, 2016 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of 
Michigan along with the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 
and the law firm of Covington & Burling.11 In Morningside Community v. 
Sabree, one of the plaintiffs’ allegations is that Wayne County’s property tax 
foreclosure practices violate the Fair Housing Act (FHA) because they 
disparately impact African-Americans homeowners, causing them to “lose 
their homes through tax foreclosure at a higher rate than non-African-
 
 6 See Complaint ¶¶ 2, 8, Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Sabree, No. 16-008807-CH (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 
13, 2016). 
 7 See Bernadette Atuahene & Timothy R. Hodge, Stategraft, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (2018). 
 8 Id., at 13. 
 9 See generally Alex Alsup, A Recent History of Tax Foreclosure, LOVELAND BLOG (Nov. 9, 2015), 
https://makeloveland.com/blog/a-recent-history-of-tax-foreclosure [https://perma.cc/FXF9-XYZ3] 
(describing Detroit’s foreclosure crisis); Archival Tax Foreclosures in Detroit, 2002–2013, DATA 
DRIVEN DETROIT, http://bit.ly/2bpFd8A [https://perma.cc/AQ99-ZQHR] (identifying properties in 
Detroit that were listed in a tax foreclosure auction between 2002 and 2013). The city’s published file on 
their open data portal has 382,051 records. See Parcel Map, CITY OF DETROIT (published Feb. 4, 2015; 
updated Jan. 2, 2018), https://data.detroitmi.gov/Property-Parcels/Parcel-Map/fxkw-udwf 
[https://perma.cc/5BEQ-RJDY] (enter “table view” to see number of property records maintained by 
city). 
 10 See David C. Wheelock, The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the 
Great Depression, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 133, 138–39 (2008). 
 11 See Complaint, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 252–59. 
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American homeowners in Wayne County.”12 The plaintiffs brought the case 
in the Wayne County Circuit Court, but Judge Robert Colombo dismissed 
the FHA claim, ruling that it should have been brought in the Michigan Tax 
Tribunal.13 On September 21, 2017, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed 
the lower court’s finding of improper jurisdiction.14 On November 1, 2017, 
plaintiffs asked the Michigan Supreme Court to hear an appeal, which the 
court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on January 24, 2018.15 
Although this challenge was not successful, this Essay builds on my initial 
study of unconstitutional property tax assessments in Detroit to explore 
whether unconstitutional tax assessments and the resulting tax foreclosures 
in Wayne County violate the FHA in the hope that a future court might take 
it up. 
The Morningside plaintiffs’ FHA claim relied on the disparate impact 
theory of equal protection, which is dead in constitutional jurisprudence, but 
alive and well in the areas of the law where the legislature intervened, such 
as the FHA.16 Disparate treatment requires plaintiffs to show that the 
discriminatory act was intentional, while disparate impact analysis bypasses 
intent-based queries to focus instead on the policy’s discriminatory effect.17 
 
 12 Id. ¶ 256. 
 13 Morningside Cmty. Org.v. Wayne Cty Treasurer, No. 336430, 2017 WL 4182985, at *3 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017) (per curiam) (explaining the trial court’s reasoning); see also Mackenzie Walz, 
Morningside Community Organization v. Sabree, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 6, 
2018), https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15427 [https://perma.cc/UC7Z-4FNX].  
 14 Morningside Cmty. Org., 2017 WL 4182985, at *1.  
 15 Morningside Cmty Org. v. Wayne Cty. Treasurer, 905 N.W.2d 597, 598 (Mich. 2018).  
 16 Prior to 1976, the disparate impact theory of equal protection required plaintiffs to prove that a 
law, policy, or practice had a discriminatory effect on a protected class. In 1976, the Supreme Court 
sidelined the disparate impact theory and ruled in Washington v. Davis that a violation of the 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause necessitates a showing of disparate treatment, requiring plaintiffs 
to prove that the decision in question was motivated by a discriminatory purpose or intent. Disparate 
impact now only comes into play when a discriminatory purpose motivates the decision. See generally 
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003) 
(examining whether equal protection affirmatively forbids the use of statutory disparate impact 
standards); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of 
Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357 (2013) 
(discussing the history of disparate impact claims in recent FHA cases). 
 17 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977) 
(“When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this 
judicial deference [to decisions of legislative and administrative bodies] is no longer justified.”); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247–48 (1976) (“[Title VII] involves a more probing judicial review 
of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is 
appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is 
claimed. We are not disposed to adopt this more rigorous standard for the purposes of applying the Fifth 
and the Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as this.”). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1987), for an application of this doctrine to capital punishment sentences. Plaintiffs presented the court 
with the Baldus study, which used 2,000 murder sentencings delivered between 1973 and 1979 to 
investigate whether a victim’s race affected Georgia prosecutors’ and juries’ decisions to seek and impose 
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This Essay marshals social science evidence to make an actionable claim of 
racial discrimination based upon a theory of disparate impact. In Part I, I 
explain the property tax assessment and foreclosure processes in the City of 
Detroit and Wayne County. Part II explores whether the FHA applies to 
property tax administration and, more specifically, to unconstitutional tax 
assessments and the resulting property tax foreclosures in Wayne County. I 
explain the methodology used in Part III. Part IV analyzes assessment and 
foreclosure data, which show clearly that Wayne County’s predominately 
African-American cities experience unconstitutional property tax 
assessments and tax foreclosures at a far greater rate than its predominately 
white cities. The final section concludes. 
Most importantly, this Essay shows that the property tax malfeasance 
occurring in Wayne County is a quintessential example of institutional 
racism, which is when the laws, policies, or practices of any institution or 
group of institutions intentionally or unintentionally results in race-based 
inequities or discrimination.18 As opposed to individual racism—where 
people discriminate based on the conscious or unconscious belief that one 
race is superior to another—the perpetrators of the harm are not readily 
identifiable individuals who society can resolutely condemn. The 
perpetrators instead are an institution or assortment of institutions. The 
Detroit Assessment Division, the Wayne County Equalization Division, and 
the Wayne County Treasurer are the government agencies directly at fault. 
But, there are also several other actors implicated in the malfeasance. The 
State of Michigan, for example, under-funded its cities,19 leaving many cities 
 
the death penalty. The study found that—even when controlling for thirty-nine nonracial variables that 
play a role in capital punishment sentences—a death sentence was 4.3 times more likely for defendants 
who killed whites than those who killed African-Americans. Assuming the evidence of racial disparity 
was correct, the court nonetheless ruled that there was no constitutional violation because the plaintiff 
failed to prove that the officials who produced McCleskey’s sentence intended to discriminate based on 
race. Id. at 319. 
 18 Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (2000) (attempting to define institutional racism as a process 
that is created “through the operation of various mental processes. [sic] frequently repeated patterns of 
activity relatively quickly take on an unexamined, rule-like status such that they are spontaneously 
followed and disrupted only with difficulty”); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial 
Goodwill Isn’t Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1999) (“[Institutional racism, contrasted to individual 
racism,] is less overt, far more subtle, less identifiable in terms of specific individuals committing the 
acts. But it is no less destructive of human life. The second type originates in the operation of established 
and respected forces in the society . . . .”); Brian J. Sutherland, Comment, Killing Jim Crow and the 
Undead Nondelegation Doctrine with Privately Enforceable Federal Regulations, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
917, 921 (2006) (“Institutional racism is racial discrimination perpetrated whether intentionally or not 
within the policies, practices, procedures, laws, rules, or regulations of any public or private institution. 
It is the legacy of American slavery and a lingering obstacle to true racial equality in this country.”). 
 19 Christina Hall, 14 Cities Sue Michigan, Say Revenue-Sharing Math Isn’t Right, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (published Sept. 9, 2016, 12:28 PM; updated Sept. 9, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://www.freep.com/ 
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financially vulnerable and predisposed to predatory, covert revenue-raising 
tactics such as illegally inflated property tax assessments. Also, Detroit 
experienced the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history, 
restructuring over eighteen billion dollars in debt and long-term liabilities.20 
During the city’s financial crisis, the governor-appointed emergency 
manager, Kevyn Orr, imposed austerity measures upon the City of Detroit, 
which further crippled its ability to invest in the bureaucratic infrastructure 
necessary to ensure property tax assessments were in line with the Michigan 
Constitution.21 In addition, Detroit’s Assessment Division did not have the 
capacity to deal with the steep 2008 drop in home values precipitated by the 
predatory lending practices of banks and the resulting subprime mortgage 
crisis.22 Given the complex reasons behind the property tax malfeasance, the 
perpetrators of the harm are dispersed, fractionated, and thus invisible—
hidden in plain sight. But, African-American homeowners suffered 
disproportionately from the malfeasance, so the victims are manifest and 
unmistakable, making this a casebook example of institutional racism. 
I. PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION IN WAYNE COUNTY23 
A. A Primer on Property Tax Calculations in Michigan 
Michigan officials are legally required to assess all properties 




 20 See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 113 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); James Spiotto, Detroit’s 
Bankruptcy Is the Nation’s Largest, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2013/07/18/us/detroit-bankruptcy-is-the-largest-in-nation.html [https://perma.cc/Y8A3-XNAE] 
(reporting that the city’s bankruptcy is the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history in terms of debt). 
 21 See generally MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1541–.1575 (2018) (“An emergency manager shall 
develop and may amend a written financial and operating plan for the local government.”). 
 22 See generally Douglas S. Massey et al., Riding the Stagecoach to Hell: A Qualitative Analysis of 
Racial Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 15 CITY & COMMUNITY 118 (2016) (quantitatively and 
qualitatively demonstrating how racialized mechanisms worked to produce cumulative disadvantage for 
African-Americans during U.S. housing boom and bust cycles); Jacob S. Rugh et al., Race, Space, and 
Cumulative Disadvantage: A Case Study of the Subprime Lending Collapse, 62 SOC. PROBS. 186 (2015) 
(describing how residential segregation and racial inequality generate racialized patterns of subprime 
lending that led to financial hardship among black borrowers). 
 23 For a more in-depth description of the practices, see Bernadette Atuahene & Christopher Berry, 
Taxed Out: Illegal Property Tax Assessments and the Epidemic of Tax Foreclosures in Detroit 
 (Mar. 7, 2018) (manuscript with publication schedule forthcoming) (on file with Northwestern University 
Law Review). 
 24 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.10(1) (2018); WM. T. DUST, MANUAL OF THE COMMON COUNCIL AND 
OF THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT 29–30 (1886) (stating that the Board of 
Assessors has a duty to assess the true cash value of all real and personal property each fiscal year). 
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Assessed Value (AV), State Equalized Value (SEV), and Taxable Value 
(TV).25 
The first calculation is the AV. Each local assessor is required to 
conduct sales or appraisal studies to determine the market value of each 
property within her jurisdiction.26 The industry standard for appraisals of 
residential housing is the market approach,27 which requires assessors to 
determine the market value of a property based on the sale price of 
comparable properties, taking into consideration factors such as the 
property’s size, age, condition, location, existing use, zoning, natural assets, 
and present economic income.28 The assessors then set the AV not to exceed 
the constitutionally permitted limit of 50% of the property’s determined 
market value. That is, according to the Michigan Constitution, for each 
taxable property: AV≤Market Value/2. 
The second calculation is the SEV. The point of the SEV is to ensure 
that the AV is uniform at the city, county, and state levels as mandated by 
the Michigan Constitution.29 Calculating the SEV is a two-step process. In 
the first step, the county conducts an annual equalization study, which 
determines the assessment-to-market ratio in each of its taxing jurisdictions 
for each class of property.30 The goal of county equalization is to bring the 
total valuation of each class of property within the county as close to the 50% 
constitutional limit as possible.31 If uniformity is not present, then each 
 
 25 MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 1. 
 26 Fairplains Twp. v. Montcalm Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 542 N.W.2d 897, 898–99 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 27 INT’L ASSOC. OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, supra note 3, at 9. 
 28 See Meadowlanes Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass’n v. City of Holland, 473 N.W.2d 636, 642, 651 
(Mich. 1991) (noting that “the appraiser should adjust the sales price of comparables for differences in 
size, age, condition, location, and other value influences”); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(1) 
(2018) (describing various factors an assessor should consider in determining “true cash value”); 
Antisdale v. City of Galesburg, 362 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Mich. 1984) (“The market approach to value has 
the capacity to cure this deficiency because evidence of the sales prices of a number of comparable 
properties, if sufficiently similar, supports the conclusion that factors extrinsic to the properties have not 
entered into the value placed on the properties by the parties.”); Great Lakes Div. of Nat’l Steel Corp. v. 
City of Ecorse, 576 N.W.2d 667, 674, 678–79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
 29 See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (stating that true cash value is the proportion at which property shall 
be uniformly assessed); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.34 (2018) (tasking county commissioners “in the 
matter of equalization of assessments” in accordance with the Michigan Constitution); DETROIT, MICH. 
CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part IV (2017) (citing duties under MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3). 
 30 MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, BULLETIN NO. 11 OF 2011, EQUALIZATION PROCESS FOR 2012, 
at 1 (2014), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Bulletin11of2011_367617_7.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/48XQ-3VJ3]. 
 31  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27a (2018); Sch. Dist. No. 9 v. Bd. of Supervisors of Washtenaw Cty., 
67 N.W.2d 165, 172 (Mich. 1954) (noting that the purpose of equalization is not only to provide basis for 
apportionment of property taxes, but also to “carry out the provisions relating to uniformity of taxation” 
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county’s board of commissioners can equalize the AV for any class of 
property by applying an adjustment factor (also called equalization factor).32 
For instance, if the county finds that the average AV for all commercial 
properties in one of its cities is well below 50% of the average market value 
of all commercial properties in that city, then it can apply a factor to increase 
the AV for the entire class of commercial properties. In the second step, the 
county sends its equalized values to the state because equalization must also 
happen at the state level to ensure that all counties within the state are paying 
their fair share of taxes.33 If uniformity is not present, then the State Tax 
Commission can apply an adjustment factor to equalize the assessments of 
all counties within the state.34 This double-tiered process yields the SEV. 
The third calculation is the TV, which is the capped SEV. To prevent 
sharp increases in an owner’s property tax bill, the Michigan Constitution 
(Proposal A) caps the annual increase in a property’s TV so long as it is 
owned by the same person.35 Consequently, if a property’s market value 
escalates substantially over the years, then TV will be less than SEV. But, 
when the owner transfers her property, Proposal A eliminates the cap and 
SEV=TV.36 Most critically, the assessor multiplies the TV by the authorized 
 
contained in the constitution); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 209.41(6) (2009); MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, 
supra note 5, at 1. 
 32 See MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 1 (stating the board of commissioners in every 
county can apply an equalization factor to assessed values to ensure that property owners pay their fair 
share of taxes). Taxpayers can file suit if they believe that the county equalization process is legally 
flawed. See Brittany Park Apartments v. Twp. of Harrison, 304 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) 
(alleging that the equalized value exceeded 50% of true cash value, in violation of Art. 9, § 3 of the 
Michigan Constitution). 
 33 MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, supra note 30. 
 34 See Ann Arbor Twp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 227 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Mich. 1975) (noting that 
previous courts have “said that the ‘process of equalization is designed to enhance the goal of uniformity.’ 
That goal is achieved by both intra- and inter-county equalization, by uniformity within and between the 
counties”) (footnotes omitted). 
 35 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (“For taxes levied in 1995 and each year thereafter, the legislature shall 
provide that the taxable value of each parcel of property adjusted for additions and losses, shall not 
increase each year by more than the increase in the immediately preceding year in the general price level, 
as defined in section 33 of this article, or 5 percent, whichever is less until ownership of the parcel of 
property is transferred. When ownership of the parcel of property is transferred as defined by law, the 
parcel shall be assessed at the applicable proportion of current true cash value.”). 
 36 See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27a(3) (“[T]he property’s 
taxable value for the calendar year following the year of the transfer is the property’s state equalized 
valuation for the calendar year following the transfer.”); MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, GUIDE TO 
BASIC ASSESSING 48 (2018), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/ 
Guide_to_Basic_Assessing_1-16_511508_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/R52B-65QB] (stating that the 
following transfers are not considered transfers of ownership: spouse to spouse, tenancy by entireties, life 
lease, foreclosure/forfeiture, redemption—forfeited land for non-payment of taxes, conveyance to trust 
when beneficiary is same as settlor, court order, joint tenancy, security interest; affiliated group, normal 
public trading, common control, tax free reorganization, and  relationship by first degree of blood or 
affinity to the first degree). 
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millage rate to determine the amount of property taxes homeowners owe 
annually.37 
B. From Assessment to Foreclosure: The Underpinnings of the Property 
Tax Foreclosure Crisis in Detroit 
Detroit’s Assessments Division determines the assessed, taxable, and 
capped values for all classes of property (residential, commercial, personal, 
and industrial) with the assistance of computer software.38 Between 2002 and 
2003, the Assessments Division decided to switch computer software 
systems—from the legacy mainframe system to the Equalizer system—but 
the changeover was not done properly. A senior assessment official said, “the 
conversion should have happened over several years with officials going into 
the field and verifying the information. But, in 2002 things began going south 
in Detroit and we did not have the manpower or funding to do the switch 
properly.”39 Consequently, significant data were lost because the 
Assessments Division only transferred building values to the new Equalizer 
system without the underlying data on which the numbers were based.40 After 
the Assessments Division bungled the conversion, property descriptions, 
property valuations, and other records were inaccurate and incomplete.41 
 
 37 See generally MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 38 DETROIT OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE FINANCE 
DEPARTMENT ASSESSMENTS DIVISION JULY 2008–JUNE 2011, at 3 (Sept. 10, 2012), http://bit.ly/
2hu2XJK [https://perma.cc/XYQ8-D3FV] [hereinafter PERFORMANCE AUDIT] (“The Assessments 
Division handles the assessments of all 387,000 parcels of residential, commercial, personal, and 
industrial properties in the City of Detroit. They are responsible to discover, identify, record, and annually 
determine the assessed, taxable, and capped values for the purpose of levying taxes that generate 
substantial revenue for the City.”). 
 39 Interview with Senior Assessment Official, in Detroit, Mich. (June 15, 2017). 
 40 Id.; see also PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 9 (“The Assessments Division maintains 
assessment information on manual property record cards and electronically in Equalizer. Several issues 
were associated with converting data from the manual property record cards, to IPDS, and subsequently 
to Equalizer. Information on property record cards did not match information in the system, or the actual 
physical property. Management acknowledged that they have accuracy issues with property information 
because of the conversion, economic conditions, and changing property valuations. The result is 
inaccurate or incomplete information and errors in property descriptions and valuations in the 
Equalizer.”). 
 41 See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 10, 17 (“Many exceptions were found during our 
review of sales and acquisitions of city-owned property handled by the Planning and Development 
Department (P&DD): A majority (or 37 out of 48) of P&DD sales of city-owned property were not 
accurately reflected in Equalizer.”); id. at 9–10 (“Prior to the conversion a property listed three 
commercial buildings, however, after the conversion the property listed one store, and two apartment 
buildings; A vacant lot which still included the original building [and] assessed values were not updated 
appropriately; A property that was improperly listed as tax exempt, and the apartment building only had 
a base rate of $5 per square feet. The error rate for accuracy of property information on property record 
cards (the manual assessing system), as well as information in Equalizer, was greater than 5%, which is 
not a passing score according to the Michigan State Tax Commission (STC) . . . . The results of site visits 
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Consequently, most properties in the Equalizer system were in override, 
which in Detroit meant that the assessments were not based on systematically 
calculated market values.42 Instead, the assessments were based on 
incremental, ad hoc adjustments to existing property values.43 
FIGURE 1: MEDIAN SALE PRICE OF SINGLE FAMILY HOMES IN DETROIT (2007–2016)44 
SOURCE: ZILLOW, DETROIT, MI HOME VALUE INDEX (SINGLE FAMILY HOMES)45 
 
 When property values plummeted in 2008 (see Figure 1), this makeshift 
system became sorely unworkable. The City of Detroit was systematically 
assessing properties in violation of the Michigan Constitution because it 
lacked the personnel to update the market value of properties in its taxing 
 
by the OAG, revealed that for five of the 22 (22.7%) residential properties audited, the actual condition 
of the building or property did not match its condition in Equalizer.”). 
 42 Id. at 9 (“In the City’s electronic assessing system known as ‘Equalizer’, a property is in an 
‘override status’ when its assessed value is input as a total amount, versus the system method of 
calculating a value based on physical property attributes and other assessment criteria. The property’s 
assessed value is ‘disconnected’ in the system. Assessed values in Equalizer are historical aggregate 
amounts, which were transferred from the previous assessing system known as ‘IPDS’ (Integrated 
Physical Data Systems): Of the 42 properties audited, 28 (66.7%) remain in override status; A 
representative in the Assessments Division estimated that 92% of the City’s parcels 387,000 remain in 
override status in Equalizer.”). 
 43 See generally Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23. 
44 This figure first appeared in Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7, and is reprinted with permission 
from the Southern California Law Review. 
 45 See Detroit Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW (last updated Feb. 28, 2018), 
http://www.zillow.com/detroit-mi/home-values [https://perma.cc/J23W-ZUSJ].  
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jurisdiction as required by law.46 In 2012, Detroit’s auditor general 
scrutinized the Assessments Division and found that the average number of 
parcels per appraiser was 6,911, which is nearly double the recommended 
ratio.47 The personnel shortage also meant that the Assessments Division 
could not carry out state-mandated site visits designed to update property 
characteristics and values.48 The auditor general found that  
[t]he Division does not comply with state requirements or its internal metric to 
conduct site visits for 30% of properties annually. Instead, based on our sample, 
the average number of years since the last recorded site visits is 22.8 years for 
commercial and industrial properties and 30.0 years for residential properties.49 
Without annual site visits, both the property records and the assessments 
derived from them are inaccurate.50 The situation worsened in 2013 when 
Detroit’s historic bankruptcy left the city even more cash-strapped and 
without sufficient resources to conduct basic city services such as fixing 
streetlights, hiring police officers, and staffing its Assessments Division.51 
 
 46 The Assessments Division was underfunded. See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 50 
(“During the budget hearings, City Council questioned the Assessments Division’s proposed 2010–2011 
budget noting that in spite of the Division ‘confronting an increasing caseload of work . . . the Finance 
Department asked for fewer resources in terms of full time equivalent (FTE) and dollars than the Mayor’s 
recommended budget.’”) (omission in original). 
 47 Id. (“The Michigan’s State Assessors Board (MSAB) recommends as a general rule, ‘that an 
effective assessment system requires one full-time employee, including clericals per 1,500 to 3,500 
parcels’. In fiscal year 2010-2011, the Assessments Division had a staff of 52 employees (including one 
contractor) versus the approved budget of 56 positions.”). 
 48 Id. at 11 (“Division Management stated that while their goal is to conduct site reviews of 30% of 
all properties annually - it is a goal and not based on actual performance. It was stated that they do not 
have staff to routinely do site visits.”). In 2010, the Michigan State Tax Commission sent all municipal 
tax assessors a memorandum entitled Property Inspection: “The purpose of this Bulletin is to provide 
assessing officers with guidance regarding the inspection of property. As a guideline, the State Tax 
Commission recommends that assessors inspect 20% of properties in their local unit annually. Of primary 
importance is that assessors have a documented inspection plan that provides for consistent review of all 
properties within the local unit over a specified period of time.” MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, 
BULLETIN NO. 2 OF 2014, PROPERTY INSPECTION 1 (2014), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/
treasury/Bulletin2014-2PropertyInspection_447098_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH9K-JYDW]. 
 49 See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 9. 
 50 See id. at 11 (“The effect of not conducting the required annual site visits results in detailed 
property records (including data in Equalizer), assessments, and the City’s tax rolls that are not accurate. 
Assessments can only be as accurate as the property data on which they are based. Understated 
assessments results in lost revenues for the City, while overstatements increase revenues at the expense 
of property owners.”); see also id. at 36 (“[A]nnual sales studies which are used to determine assessment 
ratios and ultimately, assessed values would be adversely affected if data relating to sales is missing or 
not accurate.”). 
 51 Matt Helms et al., 9 Ways Detroit Is Changing After Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (published 
Nov. 9, 2014, 12:00 AM; updated Nov. 9, 2014, 1:38 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/
detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/09/detroit-city-services-bankruptcy/18716557 [https://perma.cc/H6U7-
6CZB] (“Average police response times clocked in at almost an hour. Tens of thousands of broken 
streetlights meant entire streets go dark at nightfall. And though Detroit has more than 200 municipal 
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In 2014, in response to the damning exposé report written by Detroit’s 
own auditor general, the Michigan State Tax Commission took control of 
Detroit’s Assessments Division because of “widespread over-assessments 
and rampant tax delinquencies.”52 In addition, in 2015, the Michigan State 
Tax Commission created the Audit of the Minimum Assessing Requirements 
(AMAR), which is its mechanism for ensuring that local assessing units are 
following Michigan laws and devising corrective action plans to address any 
discovered deficiencies.53 With the exception of Detroit, all local units in 
Wayne County went through the AMAR in 2015.54 
In addition to the state tax commission’s efforts to ensure accuracy, if 
taxpayers believe that the local assessor has overassessed them, they have a 
right to appeal. In Detroit, homeowners must first submit an appeal with the 
Board of Assessors between February 1 and February 15 of each tax year.55 
If the homeowner is not satisfied with the Board of Assessors’ decision, 
then she can appeal to the Board of Review, which conducts hearings in 
March.56 If she is still not satisfied, the homeowner can file an appeal with 
 
parks, the city could only afford to keep about a quarter of them open.”). Although some funding of public 
services in some neighborhoods may have been restored, other neighborhoods have yet to see this type 
of attention. See Quinn Klinefelter, Post-Bankruptcy, a Booming Detroit Is Still Fragile, NPR (Dec. 12, 
2015, 5:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/12/12/459192004/post-bankruptcy-a-booming-detroit-is-still-
fragile [https://perma.cc/GV3S-C2WS]. 
 52 See Christine Ferretti, State Lifts Oversight of Detroit Property Assessments, DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 
30, 2017, 6:23 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/08/30/state-lifts-
oversight-detroit-property-assessments/105130886 [https://perma.cc/ZWF9-FEJY]. 
 53 See MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, AUDIT OF MINIMUM ASSESSING REQUIREMENTS AMAR 
REVIEW SHEET (2017), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/ 
AMAR_Adopted_9-18-17_with_Hyperlinks_601914_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6C6-38EX]. 
 54 An AMAR report in Detroit would have been duplicative because, as part of the city’s corrective 
action plan, the STC mandated a complete reappraisal of properties in its jurisdiction and regular progress 
reports. To review all AMAR reports for Wayne County, see Local Audit and Finance Division – 
Document Search, MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, (2015), https://treas-secure.state.mi.us/LAFDocSearch 
[https://perma.cc/ZWF9-FEJY] (search county field for “Wayne”). 
 55 DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-9-3 (1964) (“The period for the review by the board 
of assessors shall be February first (1st) to February fifteenth (15th), inclusive, each year.”). 
Notwithstanding, in past years, the City of Detroit has lengthened the assessor’s review period from 
January 25 to February 18. See Joe Guillen, Detroit Extends Time to Appeal Property Valuation, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (published Feb. 13, 2017, 1:15 PM; updated Feb. 13, 2017, 7:21 PM), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2017/02/13/detroit-extends-time-appeal-
property-valuation/97850946 [https://perma.cc/97HP-GB5V] (due to late property assessment 
determinations, the city extended the assessment review period to allow for same two-week opportunity 
to challenge property valuation). Property classified as commercial, industrial, or utility can appeal 
directly to the Michigan Tax Tribunal. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.735a(4)(a) (2008). 
 56 See DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-9-7 (1964); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§§ 211.28–30 (2018) (the entire membership of the board of review is responsible for reviewing the 
assessment roll to ensure the assessments are equitable and the capped and taxable valuations are 
properly calculated). 
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the Michigan Tax Tribunal by July 30 of the tax year under protest.57 Only if 
the Tax Tribunal has committed “fraud, error of law, or the adoption of 
wrong principles,” can taxpayers appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals 
and then the state supreme court.58 
Although an appeal process exists, for poor and working-class families 
who have limited time, low information, and insufficient monetary resources 
to hire an advocate, the appeal process can be inaccessible, opaque, and 
onerous. Consequently, only a small fraction of homeowners appeal their 
property taxes. Instead, the majority of taxpayers in Detroit and other Wayne 
County municipalities have paid inflated property tax bills based upon 
unconstitutional assessments, and when they cannot afford to pay, they face 
foreclosure. 
In a recent study, Christopher Berry and I measure the impact of 
unconstitutional property tax assessments on tax foreclosure rates in 
Detroit.59 Controlling for purchase price, location, and time-of-sale, we 
demonstrate that properties assessed at higher rates were more likely to 
experience a subsequent tax foreclosure. We estimate that 10% of all tax 
foreclosures were caused by unconstitutional tax assessments. Moreover, 
since lower-priced homes were over-assessed at a greater frequency and 
magnitude than higher-priced homes, we estimate that 25% of tax 
foreclosures among homes less than $8,000 in sale price were due to 
unconstitutional property tax assessments. There is an undeniable link 
between illegally inflated tax assessments and tax foreclosures. 
Wayne County’s tax foreclosure process is fairly straightforward. 
According to the Delinquent Property Tax Foreclosure Public Act (1999), 
delinquent properties are forfeited to the Wayne County treasurer in their 
second year of delinquency, and the foreclosure process begins if the 
property taxes remain unpaid on March 31 in their third year of 
delinquency.60 The Wayne County treasurer can sell the property to the state, 
county, or city government for the cost of all unpaid taxes, interest, and fees 
 
 57 See, Property Assessment Appeal Information, CITY OF DETROIT, http://www.detroitmi.gov/How-
Do-I/Appeal/Property-Assessment-Appeal-Information [https://perma.cc/3F74-JM86]. 
 58 See MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 28 (“In the absence of fraud, error of law or the adoption of wrong 
principles, no appeal may be taken to any court from any final agency provided for the administration of 
property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation.”). 
 59 Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23. 
 60 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.78g (2015). Also, Wayne County can choose to accelerate the 
foreclosure process for abandoned properties. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.963 (1999) (“Therefore, the 
local unit of government hereby notifies residents and owners of property within the local unit of 
government that abandoned tax delinquent property will be identified and inspected and may be certified 
as certified abandoned property under the certification of abandoned property for accelerated forfeiture 
act and subject to accelerated forfeiture and foreclosure under the general property tax act.”). 
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owed to other governmental entities.61 The unsold properties go first to the 
Wayne County auction, where the minimum bid is all unpaid taxes, interest, 
and fees.62 The unsold properties from the first auction then go to the second 
one, where the opening bid is $500.63 Unsold properties from the second 
auction are owned by the Wayne County Treasurer, unless the city accepts 
them.64 
In sum, this Section documents the process from a property’s 
assessment to its foreclosure, highlighting the origins of unconstitutional 
property tax assessments and their outsized role in Detroit’s unprecedented 
tax foreclosure rates. The next Part discusses the FHA and its applicability 
to property tax administration in Wayne County. 
II. FAIR HOUSING ACT (FHA) 
Housing discrimination ails America’s democracy, and the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA) is the federal government’s primary legislative cure.65 
The FHA was enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and 
stands as one of the Civil Rights Movement’s crowning achievements.66 The 
FHA’s initial goal was to end discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
and national origin in the sale, rental, and financing of dwellings.67 In 1974, 
 
 61 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.78m(1) (2015). 
 62 Id.  § 211.78m(2). 
 63 See id. § 211.78m(5) (allowing county to establish a reasonable opening bid to recover cost of 
sale); Margaret Dewar et al., Disinvesting in the City: The Role of Tax Foreclosure in Detroit, 51 URB. 
AFF. REV. 587, 591 (2015) (noting that Wayne County has set $500 as cost recovery amount). 
 64 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.78m(6). 
 65 See generally Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 
8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969) (describing the legislative history of Title VIII); Joshua L. Farrell, The 
FHA’s Origins: How Its Valuation Method Fostered Racial Segregation and Suburban Sprawl, 11 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 374 (2002) (discussing FHA’s history); Charles McCurdy 
Mathias, Jr. & Marion Morris, Fair Housing Legislation: Not an Easy Row to Hoe, 4 CITYSCAPE 21 
(1999) (discussing the history of the passage of the FHA); Jonathan Zasloff, The Secret History of the 
Fair Housing Act, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 247 (2016) (discussing the political deal-making surrounding 
the drafting and passage of the FHA). 
 66 See generally Charles M. Lamb, Congress, the Courts, and Civil Rights: The Fair Housing Act of 
1968 Revisited, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1115 (1982) (discussing the history of the drafting and passage of FHA 
in relation to the Civil Rights Movement); Wilhelmina A. Leigh, Civil Rights Legislation and the Housing 
Status of Black Americans: An Overview, 19 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 5 (1991) (discussing the state of 
discrimination and racial segregation in housing during and after the Civil Rights Movement and the 
impact of the FHA). 
 67 See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970) (prior to 1988 amendment) (“[I]t shall be 
unlawful—(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for 
the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, 
color, religion, or national origin.”); see also id. § 3605 (prior to 1988 amendment) (“[I]t shall be unlawful 
for any bank, building and loan association, insurance company or other corporation, association, firm or 
enterprise whose business consists in whole or in part in the making of commercial real estate loans, to 
deny a loan or other financial assistance to a person applying therefor for the purpose of purchasing, 
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Congress added sex to the list of protected categories.68 In 1988, Congress 
enacted further amendments to the FHA, ratcheting up the federal 
government’s efforts to eradicate housing discrimination.69 The amendments 
strengthened enforcement of the FHA, added handicap and familial status to 
the list of protected categories, provided monetary damages for victims of 
discriminatory housing practices, and extended the FHA’s reach beyond 
financing to all residential real estate-related transactions.70 More 
importantly, the amendments explicitly authorize the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to create 
regulations for the implementation of the FHA.71 So long as HUD’s 
regulations reflect a reasonable construction of the law, courts are required 
to give them “great weight.”72 
But, in spite of the FHA, housing discrimination has continued, 
especially for African-Americans. The average white person in metropolitan 
American lives in a neighborhood that is 75% white, whereas a typical 
African-American lives in a neighborhood that is only 35% white and as 
much as 45% black, which is not much different from the situation in 1940.73 
 
constructing, improving, repairing or maintaining a dwelling, or to discriminate against him in the fixing 
of the amount, interest rate, duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial 
assistance, because of the race, color, religion, or national origin of such person or of any person 
associated with him in connection with such loan or other financial assistance . . . .”). 
 68 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat. 633, 
728–29 (1974) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605, 3606, 3631). 
 69 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). 
 70 See James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of 
Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1092–98 (1989). 
 71 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 13(b), 102 Stat. 1636 (1988) 
(“In consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies, the Secretary shall, not later than the 180th day 
after the enactment of this Act . . . , issue rules to implement Title VIII . . . as amended by this Act . . . .”); 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3283 (Jan. 23, 1989) 
(“This part provides the Department’s interpretation of the coverage of the Fair Housing Act regarding 
discrimination related to the sale or rental of dwellings, the provision of services in connection therewith, 
and the availability of residential real estate-related transactions.”). See generally 24 C.F.R. §§ 0–93 
(2017) (HUD regulations regarding housing). 
 72 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 
280, 287–88 (2003) (holding that the court will rely on HUD regulations in determining the extent to 
which the FHA provides for vicarious liability); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) 
(“The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement responsibility, has issued 
guidelines interpreting § 703(h) to permit only the use of job-related tests. The administrative 
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference . . . . Since the Act and its 
legislative history support the Commission’s construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines 
as expressing the will of Congress.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); NAACP v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 300 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 73 See JOHN R. LOGAN & BRIAN J. STULTS, US2010 PROJECT, THE PERSISTENCE OF SEGREGATION 
IN THE METROPOLIS: NEW FINDINGS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 2 (2011), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/
Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPC8-ACM6] (analyzing data from 1940–
2010 to determine changes and trends in racial residential segregation over the past several decades); see 
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African-Americans still live segregated away from whites even fifty 
years after the passage of the FHA due, in part, to housing discrimination, 
which has evolved throughout the years. Initially, race was often an explicit 
reason for exclusion. For example, in one case reaching the Supreme Court, 
a community in Virginia prohibited an African-American family from using 
the community park and playground facilities to which their residence 
granted them access simply because of their race.74 In 1969, the Court ruled 
that this blunt form of racism was a clear violation of the FHA.75 
As the decades progressed, the denial of housing opportunities was 
usually no longer overtly based on race, but instead based on the more 
complex intersection of race, gender, and class.76 The FHA, however, is 
capacious enough to address racial discrimination that is both overt and 
covert. For instance, in 1974, the town of Black Jack, Missouri passed an 
ordinance preventing the construction of an affordable housing complex 
called Park View Heights in a middle-class suburb of St. Louis that was 99% 
white.77 The Eighth Circuit ruled that this action disparately impacted low-
income African-Americans’ access to suburban housing in violation of the 
FHA.78 Likewise, lawmakers in Huntington, New York restricted private 
multifamily housing projects to the two areas of the town occupied primarily 
by minorities, denying low-income minorities access to predominately white 
areas.79 In 1988, the Second Circuit ruled that the ordinance had a disparate 
impact on minorities and thus was a violation of the FHA.80 
 
also Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 
167 (2003); Douglas E. Mitchell et al., The Contributions of School Desegregation to Housing 
Integration: Case Studies in Two Large Urban Areas, 45 URB. EDUC. 166 (2010) (discussing resistance 
to residential desegregation after the civil rights era, resulting in limited desegregation in some cities). 
 74 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1969). 
 75 See id. at 236 (“What we have here is a device functionally comparable to a racially restrictive 
covenant, the judicial enforcement of which was struck down in Shelley v. Kraemer . . . .”). 
 76 Intersectionality is a social justice theory advancing the idea that gender, race, and class are 
interconnected and operate in society as “intersecting oppressions.” See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) (outlining the 
framework of intersectionality); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245–46 (1991) (stating the 
struggles created by poverty are often exacerbated by racial discrimination in housing policies). 
 77 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1181–83 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 78 Id. at 1188. 
 79 See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 
488 U.S. 15 (1988) (examining how exclusionary zoning that prevents construction of multifamily units 
in predominately white areas promotes housing segregation by isolating minorities and low-income 
residences from areas with white residents and their higher-valued properties). 
 80 See id. at 938–39 (finding the city’s zoning policy caused disproportionate harm to black residents, 
perpetuated racial segregation for the entire community, and its aims could have been achieved using less 
discriminatory means); see also Mhany Mgt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 606–16 (2d Cir. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1518 
In this Part, I explore how litigators can use the FHA to address the 
property tax foreclosure crisis in Wayne County. Section A reviews existing 
case law to determine whether the FHA applies to property tax 
administration. Section B investigates if systemic unconstitutional property 
tax assessments and the resulting foreclosures can withstand the stringent 
disparate impact analysis required by the FHA. Section C explains how 
discriminatory property tax administration in Wayne County violates FHA 
§§ 3404 and 3405. Finally, Section D discusses which courts litigators can 
approach to file a FHA claim. 
A. FHA’s Applicability to Property Tax Administration 
1. Does Case Law Indicate that Property Tax Administration Is 
Covered by the FHA? 
There are only a few cases that explicitly discuss whether the FHA 
applies to property tax administration. In 1999, a New York trial court’s 
decision in Coleman v. Seldin stated that the FHA does apply.81 Nassau 
County’s policy was to assess homes based on the cost to build the home in 
1938 rather than based on its current market value.82 This policy disparately 
impacted poor and minority homeowners because market values for houses 
in affluent (mostly white) areas increased markedly, resulting in drastic 
underassessment, while market values in low-income (mostly black) areas 
remained stable or declined, resulting in overassessment.83 The court 
declared that since the FHA is a broad, antidiscrimination statute, there is no 
valid distinction between assessment practices and other practices that courts 
have consistently ruled fall within the FHA’s purview, such as zoning 
policies.84 Consequently, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the FHA claim. Shortly before the trial was to begin, the parties entered into 
a consent decree which required Nassau County to adopt a new system for 
assessing property that was nondiscriminatory and based on fair market 
 
2016) (deciding that the abandonment of multi-family residential zoning in favor of residential townhouse 
zoning was driven by racial animus and thus violated the disparate treatment component of the Fair 
Housing Act). 
 81 See 687 N.Y.S.2d 240, 250 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“This Court concludes that the FHA applies to the 
real property assessment policies, procedures and conditions practiced and imposed by the defendants 
herein.”). 
 82 See id. at 252. 
 83 See id. at 247–48. 
 84 See id. at 250 (“The Court can discern no substantive distinction in the application of the broad 
national anti-discrimination policy, as embodied in the FHA, between zoning policies and real property 
assessment policies effecting the fair provision of housing.”). 
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value.85 Now, Coleman stands for the proposition that the FHA does, in fact, 
apply to property tax administration. 
More recently, in 2016, a New York trial court revisited the question of 
whether the FHA applies to property tax administration.86 In Robinson v. City 
of New York, plaintiffs alleged that New York City’s property tax 
classification system violated the FHA because it disparately impacted 
African-American and Hispanic residents.87 The city divided its real property 
into four classifications. African-Americans and Hispanics were twice as 
likely to reside in Class 2 (all other residential properties), while whites 
primarily resided in Class 1 properties (one- to three- family homes).88 
Although Class 1 properties had market values twice that of Class 2 
properties, Class 1 properties paid 15.5% of the city’s real property tax, while 
Class 2 paid 37%.89 Most importantly, plaintiffs claimed that apartment 
owners in Class 2 passed this mark-up along to their tenants, and so the city’s 
facially neutral property tax scheme had a racially discriminatory effect.90 
The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that plaintiffs had no standing 
because—even though they claimed that landlords pass the elevated taxes 
along to tenants—plaintiffs presented no evidence to support this claim, 
rendering their injury conjectural.91 Also, the court reasoned that plaintiffs 
presented no evidence that the property tax classification system had a 
disparate impact on African-Americans and Hispanics.92 Since the lack of 
evidence and standing dominated the court’s decision in Robinson, it never 
 
 85 See O’Shea v. Bd. of Assessors of Nassau Cty., 864 N.E.2d 1261, 1264–65 (N.Y. 2007) (noting 
the Coleman consent decree caps home value assessment increases at a maximum of 6% in any one year 
or 20% over a five-year period). 
 86 See Robinson v. City of New York, No. 151679/2014, 2015 WL 3367799, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Apr. 20, 2015), aff’d 40 N.Y.S.3d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2016). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at *1–2. 
 91 Robinson, 40 N.Y.S.3d at 383. (“Moreover, plaintiffs are not property owners and thus, they do 
not directly bear the costs of the property tax burden placed on larger buildings. The argument that 
plaintiffs nonetheless have standing, as they have been injured by the tax scheme, resulting in higher rents 
which would be reduced were real property taxes to be shared equitably among the different classes of 
real property, is speculative. At this juncture, plaintiffs’ allegations as to injury are nothing more than 
conjectural.”). 
 92 Id. at 383–84 (“Plaintiffs failed to identify where they live, other than being in apartment buildings 
in the Bronx and Queens; how much rent they pay; and, what portion, if any, of their rent is attributable 
to their landlord’s property tax obligation. Additionally, plaintiffs failed to allege that they in fact paid a 
higher rent rate than they would have had their landlords received a more favorable property tax rate . . . . 
Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim, which alleges a violation of federal Equal Protection Clause (US CONST., 
amend. XIV, § 1), and their corresponding state law claim (N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 11) fail in the absence 
of proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.” (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977); Esler v. Walters, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (N.Y. 1982))). 
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reached the question of whether the FHA applies to property tax 
administration when there is, in fact, sufficient evidence and standing. 
The FHA’s applicability to property tax administration was also 
addressed in the case of Drayton v. McIntosh County, filed in 2016.93 
Plaintiffs (joined by the U.S. Attorney General and the District Attorney for 
the Southern District of Georgia) alleged that state defendants—McIntosh 
County and the State of Georgia—discriminated against the Gullah Geechee 
population on Sapelo Island through the unequal and racially discriminatory 
provision of housing and housing-related services.94 One of the plaintiffs’ 
claims was that, due to discriminatory appraisals, many plaintiffs witnessed 
unprecedented increases in the assessed value of their homes.95 For instance, 
the assessed value of Benjamin Hall’s home skyrocketed by 3,059% in one 
year, increasing from $10,500 in 2011 to $331,650 in 2012.96 Plaintiffs 
alleged that because of these discriminatory appraisals and the soaring 
property tax bills that resulted, several people are at risk of losing their homes 
to property tax foreclosure or being forced to preemptively sell their land.97 
The court has yet to make a final ruling in Drayton. 
As mentioned in the introduction of this Essay, there is also the case of 
Morningside Community v. Sabree, where plaintiffs sued the City of Detroit 
and Wayne County, alleging that inequitable property tax assessments 
violate the Fair Housing Act.98 Beyond Coleman, Robinson, Drayton, and 
Morningside, I am not aware of any other cases that apply the FHA to 
property tax assessments, making this fairly uncharted terrain. Since the 
Supreme Court has stated that the FHA’s language is “broad and inclusive,”99 
there is a strong case that it does apply to property tax administration. 
 
93 Complaint for Damages and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Drayton v. McIntosh Cty., No. 
2:16-CV-00053, 2016 WL 3443919 (S.D. Ga. June 17, 2016). 
 94 See id. at ¶ 27. Plaintiffs contend that post-acquisition claims are cognizable under the FHA, as 
supported by HUD’s implementing regulations. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (2017) (“Limiting the use 
of privileges, services or facilities associated with a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin of an owner, tenant or a person associated with him or her.”); 
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (“Refusing to provide municipal services or property or hazard insurance for 
dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently because of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin.”). 
 95 See Complaint for Damages and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 94, at ¶¶ 305–07. 
 96 Id. ¶ 307. 
 97 See id. ¶ 321. 
 98 Complaint, supra note 6, at ¶ 1. 
 99 See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (cited by Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir. 1979)) (“The language of the Fair 
Housing Act is ‘broad and inclusive’”); see also Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 
WL 2026804, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004) (noting that the language of § 3604 regarding making 
housing unavailable should be interpreted as broadly as possible). 
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Coleman is the only case to directly rule on the matter, and that court decided 
that the FHA does indeed apply. 
2. Does the FHA Protect Housing Post-Acquisition? 
Property tax assessments and foreclosure occur after the homeowner 
has acquired the home. So if the FHA does not apply to housing post-
acquisition, then inequitable property tax administration would not fall under 
the FHA’s penumbra. Some cases have held that the FHA protects plaintiffs 
even after they have acquired their housing, but other cases have ruled it does 
not.100 
In 1984, the Seventh Circuit decided Southend Neighborhood 
Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, which involved the discriminatory 
provision of municipal services.101 The court found that, for municipal 
services to fall under § 3604(a), they must have a direct impact on plaintiffs’ 
ability as potential homebuyers or renters to locate in a particular area or on 
their ability to secure housing.102 Several lower courts followed the Seventh 
Circuit holding in Southend, rejecting § 3604(a) claims involving the 
discriminatory provision of municipal services if it did not adversely affect 
access.103 For example, in Clifton Terrace Associates, Ltd. v. United 
Technicians Corp., the court relied on Southend to reject a § 3604(a) claim, 
alleging discrimination by an elevator repair company that refused to repair 
an elevator for an apartment building because of the race of the residents.104 
The court stated that this was an issue of a service resulting in inhabitability 
of housing, but not the unavailability of housing as required under 
§ 3604(a).105 
 
 100 See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 14:3, 
at 14-21 to 14-25 & nn.32–42 (2017) (discussing many cases and the different legal theories used under 
§ 3604); infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 101 743 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 102 Id. at 1210 (first appellate case focused on FHA coverage of discrimination in municipal services, 
where the court found § 3604(a) did not apply to failure to maintain properties because impact on property 
value is not equivalent to making housing unavailable). 
 103 See, e.g., Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 192 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that highway-siting decision is not housing-related and noting that “[c]ountless private and 
official decisions may affect housing in some remote and indirect manner, but the Fair Housing Act 
requires a closer causal link between housing and the disputed action”); Lopez, 2004 WL 2026804, at *3 
(applying Southend to reject § 3604(a) claim that industrial zoning, industrial pollution, and lack of flood 
protection rendered property unavailable); Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n, 276 F. Supp. 2d 
1222, 1229–31 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that courts have interpreted § 3604(a) claims to apply to 
government actions that impact the availability of housing for minorities), vacated, No. 8:02-CV-
1955T30TGW, 2003 WL 22149660, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003) (settlement). 
 104 929 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 105 Id. 
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In Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, the 
Seventh Circuit also used this inhabitability versus unavailability dichotomy 
and argued that plaintiffs’ claim failed because they “are complaining not 
about being prevented from acquiring property but about being harassed by 
other property owners.”106 Although several courts have adopted the 
dichotomy found in Halprin,107 in Bloch v. Frischholz, the Seventh Circuit 
sitting en banc changed its position: 
We highlight the word “after” because based on a prior opinion from this court, 
Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327 
(7th Cir. 2004), the district court concluded that condo owners couldn’t rely on 
the FHA to safeguard their rights from any post-acquisition discrimination. We 
took this case to the full court to consider this important question. Upon careful 
review of the FHA and our prior opinion in Halprin, we conclude that in some 
circumstances homeowners have an FHA cause of action for discrimination that 
occurred after they moved in.108 
Halprin has been cited by several courts,109 but they often discount the 
portion of the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision that declares the FHA can 
 
 106 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 107 See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2005); Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 
192 (4th Cir. 1999); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1536–38, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994); Clifton 
Terrace Assocs. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Woods–Drake v. Lundy, 
667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982); King v. Metcalf 56 Homes Ass’n, No. 04-2192-JWL, 2004 WL 
2538379, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2004) (“The plain language of the statute . . . limits the scope of § 3604(b) 
to discrimination in connection with the sale or rental of housing. . . . [D]istrict courts have widely held 
that § 3604(b) extends only to discrimination that impacts the accessibility and availability of housing, 
not to claims of discriminatory conduct relating to the use and enjoyment of previously acquired housing.” 
(citation omitted)); Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass’n, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141–43 (S.D. 
Fla. 2004) (stating that § 3604(b) is limited to actions related to the acquisition or sale and rental of 
housing); Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass’n., No. 1:03-CV-69-LJM-WTL, 2004 WL 192106, at 
*4 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Gourlay, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1233 (“The context of the use of the phrase ‘in 
connection therewith’ clearly limits claims for discriminatory provision of services to the provision of 
those services in connection with a sale, because the preceding sentence mentions only the sale or rental 
of a dwelling.”), vacated, 2003 WL 22149660, at *1 (settlement); Miller v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98–CV–
2955–D, 2002 WL 230834, at *12–13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (granting summary judgment on Section 
3604(a) claim for similar reasons); Hall v. Lowder Realty Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1319–20 (M.D. 
Ala. 2001) (granting summary judgment against FHA plaintiff because that plaintiff had not shown that 
the alleged discriminatory conduct affected the availability of housing); United States v. Weisz, 914 F. 
Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Laramore v. Ill. Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989) . 
 108 587 F.3d 771, 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Prohibiting discrimination at the point of sale or rental 
but not at the moment of eviction would only go halfway toward ensuring availability of housing. A 
landlord would be required to rent to an African–American but then, the day after he moves in, could 
change all the locks and put up signs that said, ‘No blacks allowed.’ That clearly could not be what 
Congress had in mind when it sought to create ‘truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’”). 
 109  See, e.g., Hidden Vill., LLC v. City of Lakewood, 734 F.3d 519, 529 (6th Cir. 2013); Comm. 
Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 712–13 (9th Cir. 2009); AHF Cmty. 
Dev., LLC v. City of Dallas, 633 F. Supp. 2d 287, 298–99 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
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“reach post-acquisition discriminatory conduct that makes a dwelling 
unavailable to the owner or tenant, somewhat like a constructive eviction.”110 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that other courts have 
construed post-sale practices—such as redlining, racial steering, 
exclusionary zoning, and other actions—as denying housing in violation of 
3404(a).111 
The Eighth Circuit also questioned the reasoning in Halprin, holding 
instead that the FHA applies to housing post-acquisition—further 
discrediting the inhabitability versus unavailability dichotomy.112 In addition, 
the Eleventh Circuit has consistently applied the FHA to acts of housing 
discrimination that occur after the acquisition of housing,113 as have several 
other courts.114 Moreover, courts have consistently ruled that there is a 
 
110 Bloch, 587 F.3d at 776; see also Halprin,  388 F.3d at 328–29.  
 111 Id. at 777 (quoting Southend Neighborhood, Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 
1207, 1209 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 112 Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 113 See, e.g., Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1222–24 (11th Cir. 2016) (permitting claim 
by current tenants based on landlord’s threatening conduct); Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. 
Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2014) (allowing current owner to bring a § 3604(f) claim against 
condominium association); Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849 (11th Cir. 2010) (authorizing current 
tenant to bring a FHA claim under § 3604(b)); Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condo. Ass’n, 347 F. 
App’x 464 (11th Cir. 2009) (permitting current owner to bring a § 3604(f) claim); Massaro v. Mainlands 
Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass’n, 3 F.3d 1472 (11th Cir. 1993) (allowing current resident to bring a § 3604(a) 
claim based on discriminatory interference with the continuing use and enjoyment of their dwelling). 
 114 See, e.g., Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (“There are few ‘services or facilities’ provided at the moment of sale, but there are many 
‘services or facilities’ provided to the dwelling associated with the occupancy of the dwelling. Under this 
natural reading, the reach of the statute encompasses claims regarding services or facilities perceived to 
be wanting after the owner or tenant has acquired possession of the dwelling.”); Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 
661, 662–63, 663 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981) (enabling a homeowner to bring a claim against his neighbors under 
§ 3604(a)); Schwarz v. Vills. Charter Sch., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1187–88 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (post-
acquisition claim based on § 3604(f)); McHale v. Water’s Edge Ass’n, No. 1:14-cv-23381-UU, 2014 WL 
7883602, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2014) (post-acquisition claim based on § 3604(f)); Smith v. Zacco, 
No. 5:10-cv-360-TJC-JRK, 2011 WL 12450317, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2011) (upholding a post-
acquisition claim against developer and homeowners’ association under §§ 3604(a) and (b)); Greater New 
Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 14, 21–23 (D.D.C. 
2010) (allowing current homeowners to make a claim under § 3604(a) for disparities in the distribution 
of post-hurricane recovery funds); Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners’ 
Ass’n, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1230 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (“Accordingly, part and parcel of the purchase of a 
home within a planned community are the rights and privileges associated with membership within the 
community. It would appear, therefore, that in the context of planned communities, where association 
members have rights to use designated common areas as an incident of their ownership, discriminatory 
conduct which deprives them of exercising those rights would be actionable under the FHA.”); Richards 
v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005) (indicating 
Eleventh Circuit district courts have found that § 3604(b) claims apply to post-acquisition conduct for 
renters); U.S. v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004) (rejecting Halprin); Landesman v. Keys 
Condo. Owners Ass’n, No. C 04-2685 PJH, 2004 WL 2370638, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2004) (allowing 
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violation of § 3617 of the FHA—which prohibits coercion, intimidation, 
threats, or interference with an individual’s exercise of rights protected under 
the FHA—when sexual harassment causes a hostile environment after 
residents acquire their housing.115 Most importantly, since HUD’s 1989 
regulations require deference,116 FHA protections extend to issues arising 
after a residence’s acquisition because HUD’s regulations require this.117 
Localities provide privileges, services, and facilities post-acquisition and 
HUD’s regulations prohibit “[l]imiting the use of privileges, services or 
facilities associated with a dwelling” to any protected class.118  
The evidence suggesting that the FHA applies post-acquisition is 
overwhelming. The classic slippery slope argument explains why many 
jurists are nevertheless reluctant to apply the FHA to issues beyond the initial 
sale or rental of housing. According to the Fifth Circuit in Cox v. City of 
Dallas, “[a]lthough the FHA is meant to have a broad reach, unmooring the 
‘services’ language from the ‘sale or rental’ language pushes the FHA into a 
general anti-discrimination pose, creating rights for any discriminatory act 
which impacts property values.”119 But, the FHA ensures that all 
Americans—irrespective of their racial, gender, religious, or ethnic 
identities—have fair access to housing, so this slippery slope argument 
should not prevent its protections from extending post-acquisition. 
 
families with children to challenge condominium association facilities’ rules as unlawfully discriminatory 
under the FHA). 
 115 See, e.g., Richards, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3–4 (FHA applies to post-acquisition sexual 
harassment); Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 494–95 (D. Md. 1996) (sexual 
harassment falls into FHA prohibition of sexual discrimination). But see DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 
1004, 1008–09 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that in this case, one instance of unwanted contact did not rise to 
level of objectively hostile housing environment); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088–90 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that poor treatment of residents not solely directed at women was not actionable). 
 116 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“The power of an administrative 
agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy 
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress . . . Sometimes the 
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, 
a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))). 
 117 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2017) (“Conduct made unlawful under [section 3617] includes . . . 
[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling because of the 
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of such persons . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); id. § 100.65(b)(2) (“Failing or delaying maintenance or repairs of sale or rental dwellings because 
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”). 
 118 Id.  § 100.65(b)(4). 
 119 430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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3. Which Municipal Services Are Covered by the FHA? 
Cities and towns provide municipal services post-acquisition. The FHA 
prohibits discrimination in the provision of services related to a dwelling, 
and courts have read this to include services traditionally provided by 
municipalities.120 A key question for the present inquiry is whether property 
tax administration is one of these “services” covered by the FHA. Neither 
the text of the FHA nor HUD’s regulations provide details about exactly 
which municipal services are covered under Section 3604, but a review of 
case law shines light on this important question.121 In order to fall under the 
FHA’s umbrella, property tax administration must be a municipal service 
that affects an individual’s ability to acquire and maintain housing. 
In his treatise, Housing Discrimination: Law & Litigation, Robert 
Schwemm provides a comprehensive listing of all the cases where courts 
have ruled that the discriminatory provision of municipal services is 
actionable under § 3604(b) and when it is not.122 The relevant case law 
suggests that the municipal services included are garbage collection, fire 
protection, police protection, street paving, street lighting, sanitary sewers, 
surface water drainage, water mains, fire hydrants, and traffic controls 
signs.123 
 
 120 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2017) (“Prohibited actions relating to dwellings under paragraph (b) of 
this section include, but are not limited to: . . . Refusing to provide municipal services or property or 
hazard insurance for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently because of race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”). See generally Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition 
Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.–C.L.L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2008) (“In decisions dating back to 1974, courts have addressed the issue of whether § 3604(b) 
should apply to a situation in which, for example, a county or municipality provides inferior water, trash, 
or snow-clearing services to the majority-minority areas of town.”); Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, 
and Discriminatory Municipal Services Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 742 (2008) 
(“Although the Seventh Circuit ruled against the particular § 3604(b) claim there, the court’s dicta that 
this provision ‘applies to services generally provided by governmental units such as police and fire 
protection or garbage collection’ became the foundation for numerous subsequent decisions that 
recognized § 3604(b) as covering discriminatory municipal services.” (citing Southend Neighborhood 
Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984))). 
 121 In his article about discriminatory municipal services under the FHA, Professor Schwemm has 
carefully unearthed all the relevant cases. Schwemm, supra note 120, at 742; see also SCHWEMM, supra 
note 100 § 14:3, at 14-21 to 14-25 & nn.32–42 . 
 122 See SCHWEMM, supra note 100, at § 14:1 to §14:3. 
 123 Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 983–84 (11th Cir. 1986) (inferior street paving and related 
services and storm water drainage facilities to black neighborhoods); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. 
Supp. 571, 573, 590 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (inferior street paving and related services to black neighborhoods); 
Bryant v. City of Marianna, 532 F. Supp. 133, 135 (N.D. Fla. 1982) (discrimination in providing inferior 
street paving and maintenance, water and sewer services, drainage facilities, fire protection, parks and 
recreation facilities, and street lighting to black neighborhoods); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 
1363, 1376–79 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (inferior street paving, parks and recreation facilities, and water service 
to black neighborhoods); Selmont Improvement Ass’n v. Dallas Cty. Comm’n, 339 F. Supp. 477, 481 
(S.D. Ala. 1972) (discrimination in providing inferior street paving to black neighborhoods); see also 
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The case law, however, is not consistent. In Southend Neighborhood 
Improvement v. County of St. Clair, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the 
County’s poor maintenance of tax delinquent properties was not a municipal 
service subject to the FHA.124 In this 1984 opinion, however, the dicta states 
that § 3604(b) of the FHA applies to “services generally provided by 
governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage 
collection.”125 But, more recently, in 2013, a district court denied New York 
City’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s FHA claim, which 
alleged that there was discriminatory provision of police services in New 
York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) buildings.126 
When the case law about which municipal services are covered by the 
FHA is unclear, HUD’s regulations can shed light and clarify. For example, 
in 1984, the plaintiffs in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Cos. sought relief 
because insurance companies did not extend homeowners insurance to 
residents based on their race, or the race of the majority of homeowners in 
the area—a phenomenon otherwise known as insurance redlining.127 In the 
dicta of Mackey, the Fourth Circuit made clear that the prohibition of 
discriminatory housing services “encompasses such things as garbage 
collection and other services of the kind usually provided by 
municipalities.”128 The court, however, ruled that the FHA did not outlaw 
discrimination in homeowner’s insurance because it does not qualify as the 
provision of services connected with dwellings under § 3604(a).129 In 1992, 
the Seventh Circuit contradicted Mackey in NAACP v. American Family 
Mutual Insurance Co., when it held that the FHA does apply to insurance 
 
Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005) (“By its express terms, 
[§ 3604] applies to ‘the provision of services or facilities’ to a dwelling, such as a sewer service.”); Good 
Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 2003) (discriminatory 
denial of water); Campbell v. Bowlin, 724 F.2d 484, 489–90 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (denial of water 
and sewer facilities to plaintiff’s land in a predominantly black neighborhood based on intentional 
discrimination); Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(ruling that a predominately white city’s refusal to connect a minority housing project to the existing 
sewer system was a violation of the FHA); Davis v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324, 367–68 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discriminatory provision of police services); Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. 
Supp. 2d 456, 495–97 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (discriminatory denial of sewer services). 
124 743 F.2d 1207 (1984).  
 125 Id. at 1210. 
 126 Davis, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 367–68; Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 435–37 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). But see Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 424 (M.D. Pa. 1978) 
(holding that § 3604(b) did not extend to police protection). 
 127 724 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 128 Id. at 424. 
 129 Id. at 424–25 (arguing discrimination in homeowner’s insurance does not qualify as making 
housing unavailable under § 3604(a) and does not qualify as the provision of services in connection with 
a dwelling under § 3604(b)). 
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redlining.130 The court reasoned that § 3604 is written in general terms and 
does not apply to certain people or industries; therefore, there is no basis to 
imply an exemption for insurance providers.131 In 2000, HUD’s regulations 
explicitly outlawed discrimination in the provision of “property or hazard 
insurance for dwellings,” providing the definitive last word on the matter.132 
From the existing case law, it is unclear whether the FHA covers 
property tax administration. Since the FHA is a civil rights act dealing 
specifically with the fair acquisition and maintenance of housing, it is crucial 
that the municipal services covered directly impact these goals. Property 
taxes discriminatorily applied can prevent protected groups from accessing 
housing, or it can lead individuals and families unable to afford unfairly 
assessed property taxes to forfeit their homes, as witnessed in Detroit. Since 
property tax administration is a municipal service that affects an individual’s 
ability to acquire and maintain housing, there is a strong argument that it falls 
under the FHA’s umbrella. In addition, historically, property taxes were 
commonly used to unjustly dispossess African-Americans of their 
property,133 so there is also a strong argument that the FHA covers property 
tax administration because it was designed to counteract historical patterns 
of racial discrimination in housing.134 HUD can and should provide clarity. 
B. FHA’s Disparate Impact Analysis 
Once the court determines that the FHA applies to property tax 
administration, then the next step is to examine whether Wayne County has 
a policy or practice that causes unconstitutional tax assessments and tax 
foreclosure to disparately impact African-Americans. In Texas Department 
of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the 
Supreme Court validated HUD’s interpretation of the requirements for 
proving a disparate impact claim under the FHA.135 According to HUD’s 
regulations, “[a] practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or 
 
 130 978 F.2d 287, 297–300 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 131 See id. at 299–300. 
 132 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2000). 
 133 See Andrew W. Kahrl, Capitalizing on the Urban Fiscal Crisis: Predatory Tax Buyers in 1970s 
Chicago, 2015 J. URBAN HIST. 1, 1 (2015); Andrew W. Kahrl, The Power to Destroy: Discriminatory 
Property Assessments and the Struggle for Tax Justice in Mississippi, 82 J. S. HIST. 579, 582 (2016). 
 134 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012) (“It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional 
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 
442–43 (1968) (“[W]hen racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy 
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”). 
 135 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015); Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive 
Communities: What’s New and What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 107 (2015) (arguing that 
the Supreme Court’s standards for FHA impact cases are similar to those set forth in the HUD regulation 
but not identical). 
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predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, 
increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of 
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”136 To 
prove that there has been a disparate impact in violation of the FHA, I first 
identify Wayne County’s equalization policy as the neutral policy causing 
the statistical disparity. Then, I use the three-part burden-shifting framework 
to show that Wayne County’s equalization policy causes a disparate impact 
in violation of the FHA. 
1. A Neutral Policy Must Cause a Statistical Disparity 
The Supreme Court stated the first step in an FHA claim is that plaintiffs 
must isolate the policy that caused the disparity.137 
[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the 
plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity. 
A robust causality requirement ensures that “[r]acial imbalance . . . does not, 
without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact” and thus protects 
defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create.138 
The Court also noted that a one-time adverse decision does not 
constitute a policy.139 Courts have ruled that policies in violation of the FHA 
include: a zoning ordinance that disallowed apartments and required one acre 
lot sizes, a policy that granted tax credits only in primarily African-American 
neighborhoods, an ordinance prohibiting the rental or occupancy of a single 
family dwelling to someone other than a blood relative if the occupant did 
not first obtain a permissive use permit, and an ordinance placing a 
temporary moratorium on construction of multi-family dwellings.140 
In this case, the relevant policy is Wayne County’s equalization policy, 
which disparately impacts the county’s predominately African-American 
cities. While it is solely the local assessor’s responsibility to determine the 
 
 136 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2017); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2009) 
(arguing that disparate impact doctrine prohibits facially neutral practices with discriminatory effects on 
protected classes if the defendant cannot show a legitimate interest in pursuing the practice). 
 137 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 138 Id. (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989)). 
139 Id. 
 140 See, e.g., id. at 2515–26 (state policy of granting tax credits in urban, primarily African-American 
areas is evidence of disparate impact); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Par., 
641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 577 (E.D. La. 2009) (finding St. Bernard Parish’s twelve-month moratorium on 
construction of multi-family dwellings was a violation of the FHA); Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. 
Supp. 2d 526, 565–66 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (zoning ordinance that prohibited apartments and required one-
acre lot sizes was racially discriminatory). For more information about the litigation in St. Bernard Parish, 
see Editorial, Time Runs Out for St. Bernard Parish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/opinion/30wed3.html [https://perma.cc/E5SK-6BAZ]. 
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assessed value of each residential property,141 using its own sales or appraisal 
studies, the county must review and verify assessed values to ensure no class 
of property is unconstitutionally assessed.142 If there is inequity, then the 
equalization department “shall” apply a county equalization factor to ensure 
no class of property exceeds the constitutional limit: 50% of true cash 
value.143 According to Section 211.34(2) of the Michigan General Property 
Tax Act: 
The county board of commissioners shall examine the assessment rolls of the 
townships or cities and ascertain whether the real and personal property in the 
respective townships or cities has been equally and uniformly assessed at true 
cash value. If, on the examination, the county board of commissioners considers 
the assessments to be relatively unequal, it shall equalize the assessments by 
adding to or deducting from the valuation of the taxable property in a township 
or city an amount which in the judgment of the county board of commissioners 
will produce a sum which represents the true cash value of that property . . . .144 
If one city assesses its residential properties at a different level than 
another city in the county, then equalization is intended to rectify this 
difference and achieve uniformity.145 In Wayne County, assessors in certain 
local units were indeed assessing at a different level than assessors in other 
units, but the equalization process did not fix this disparity. As discussed 
below in Part IV, the data analysis conducted in this study demonstrates that 
residential properties in Wayne County’s predominately African-American 
cities were less likely to be assessed in line with the Michigan Constitution 
than residential properties in its predominately white cities.146 The county 
had three nonexclusive options for rectifying these disparities: 1) work with 
the cities to ensure that the cumulative assessed values for all residential 
properties did not exceed 50% of the cumulative market value, 2) apply a 
factor that would categorically reduce the assessed values of all residential 
 
 141 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.10(1) (1994). 
 142 Fairplains Twp. v. Montcalm Cty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 542 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) 
(“A sales-ratio study compares the sales prices of recent typical sales within a given property 
classification with the prior year’s assessed values for those same parcels. An appraisal study is similar, 
but is used in situations where there is an insufficient number of recent sales. Appraisal studies compare 
actual appraisals of a sampling of properties to the previous year’s assessments.”). 
 143 See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3; MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 1 (stating the 
board of commissioners in every county can apply an equalization factor to assessed values to ensure that 
property owners pay their fair share of taxes). 
 144 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.34(2) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 145 Fairplains Twp., 542 N.W.2d at 899 (stating that “[e]qualization is based on a theory that an 
assessor will assess uniformly within the district but may assess at a level different from those of assessors 
in other districts.”). 
 146 See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3. Through a FOIA request, the author has secured all of Wayne 
County’s sales and appraisal studies from 2011–2016 (on file with author). 
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properties, or 3) report the offending cities to the state tax commission, 
which—under the authority of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.10f—can assume 
jurisdiction of its assessment roll until the local unit is in compliance. 
Under the first option, once a county identifies inequalities through its 
own sales or appraisals studies, it can help the local unit to ensure the 
assessment roles are equally and uniformly assessed. Section 211.23(a) of 
Michigan’s General Property Tax Act allows the county to “employ an 
independent appraisal firm” to help local assessors determine the market 
value of properties and to equalize assessments.147 The county can also use 
its authority under Section 211.34(3) of the General Property Tax Act to 
assist local assessors with the “the development and maintenance of accurate 
property descriptions, the discovery, listing, and valuation of properties for 
tax purposes, and the development and use of uniform valuation standards 
and techniques for the assessment of property.”148 The goal of providing this 
assistance is to ensure that the cumulative assessed values for all residential 
properties (or any other class of property) do not exceed 50% of the 
cumulative market value for the category. 
But, until Detroit’s Assessments Division completed a citywide re-
assessment in January 2017, this was a futile exercise for Detroit (Wayne 
County’s largest city) because it did not have an accurate record of the 
cumulative market value for all residential homes. To determine a property’s 
market value, Michigan law requires assessors to estimate the land value and 
add to that the value of improvements less depreciation, using the most 
updated cost estimates found in the Michigan Residential Assessor’s 
Manual.149 Due to the botched switch in 2002 from the Assessments 
 
 147 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.23(a). 
 148 Id. § 211.34(3). 
 149 In reality, the land value is not usually based on an actual sale price. See id. § 211.27(1). Instead, 
it is a flat value determined by an individual based either on a variety of unstated factors or pure 
conjecture. See id. There is nominal assurance that the property’s override value is equivalent to the 
property’s market. See id. Consequently, in order for an equalization department to correctly ascertain 
the total market value for any class of property, the assessors in the local units must follow the cost 
estimates in the manual, and a significant number of properties should not be in override. See 
id. § 211.10(e) (“All assessing officials, whose duty it is to assess real or personal property on which real 
or personal property taxes are levied by any taxing unit of the state, shall use only the official assessor’s 
manual or any manual approved by the state tax commission, consistent with the official assessor’s 
manual, with their latest supplements, as prepared or approved by the state tax commission as a guide in 
preparing assessments.”); see also APPRAISAL STANDARDS BD., UNIFORM STANDARDS OF 
PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE: 2018-2019 EDITION 40 (2018), https://nrpab-
appraiserce.ne.gov/appraiser/public/USPAP_current.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB6Z-UYNV] (supporting 
documentation must be maintained and presented for mass appraisals, including “extraordinary 
assumptions and hypothetical conditions,” indicating that properties in override must be accounted for). 
See generally STATE OF MICH., MICHIGAN RESIDENTIAL ASSESSOR’S MANUAL (2003), 
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Division’s legacy mainframe system to the new Equalizer system, the data 
in the system was inaccurate,150 and this was no secret to the Wayne County 
Equalization Department. 
Since equalization is not possible if there is no accurate record of the 
total market value for any category of real property, Wayne County could 
only perform what I call “quasi-equalization” in jurisdictions with faulty 
records. This quasi-equalization was particularly harmful to cities where 
unconstitutional tax assessments were rampant, and thus a bona fide 
equalization process was vital. Wayne County’s predominately African-
American cities are unconstitutionally assessed at significantly higher rates 
than its predominantly white cities, so Wayne County’s failure to properly 
monitor and equalize the assessments had a disparate impact on African-
Americans in violation of the FHA. 
Under the second remediation option, once Wayne County discovered 
inequities that it could not properly resolve, it should have applied a factor 
to the entire class of residential properties. Counties in the State of Michigan 
apply factors very infrequently.151 When they do apply them, the factor is 
usually greater than one, meaning that the cumulative assessed value for the 
class of property will increase. But, in this case, a factor less than one was 
required because—since property values had declined so precipitously in 
2008—an across-the-board decrease in assessed values for all residential 
properties in taxing jurisdictions with a precipitous drop in housing values 
was required. In other words, Wayne County’s facially neutral policy of 
quasi-equalization was insufficient and disparately impacted African-
American cities, which experienced sharper declines in value and hence were 
more likely to be over assessed in violation of the Michigan Constitution. 
The purpose of equalization is to achieve uniformity among the various 
taxing units in the county,152 so categorically cutting the assessed value for 
all residential property in cities where unconstitutional tax assessments 
became the norm would have helped them achieve uniformity with cities 
where assessed values did not systematically violate the Michigan 
Constitution. 
Utilizing the third remediation option, Wayne County reported 




 150 See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 10. 
 151 Interview with Lori Parr, Field Operations Section Staff Member, Michigan State Tax 
Commission, Property Services Division (October 4, 2017). 
 152 Conroy v. City of Battle Creek, 22 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Mich. 1946); O’Reilly v. Wayne Cty., 
323 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
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power to assume jurisdiction over the assessment role of a troubled local unit 
until it can come back into compliance with the law.153 As discussed earlier 
in this Essay, Detroit’s Auditor General examined the Assessments Division 
and produced a report that laid bare the intense mismanagement that caused 
systematic unconstitutional property tax assessments and rife tax 
delinquency.154 In 2014, the state tax commission’s response was to assume 
jurisdiction over Detroit’s Assessments Division and put a corrective action 
plan in place.155 It was not until August of 2017 that Detroit was released 
from the tax commission’s oversight because it completed a citywide re-
appraisal.156 After this, assessments were finally based on market values, as 
required by law. 
In sum, prior to the 2017 citywide re-appraisal, Wayne County should 
have applied a factor in cities that were habitually overassessing its residents 
or it should have helped these cities to perform a citywide reassessment, but 
it did not. This discrete and facially neutral equalization policy unduly 
burdened predominantly African-American cities. In the next Section, I go 
through the FHA’s required three-prong burden-shifting framework, and 
conclude that Wayne County’s equalization policy had a disparate impact on 
African-Americans in violation of the FHA. 
2. Three-Part Burden Shifting Framework for Proving a Disparate 
Impact Claim 
Disparate impact analysis entails a three-part burden-shifting 
framework outlined in Subpart G of HUD’s regulations and accepted by the 
Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. 
Inclusive Communities Project.157 First, to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate impact, the plaintiff must identify a facially neutral policy or 
practice that has a discriminatory effect on one of the groups protected under 
the FHA.158 A successful claim requires a comparative analysis that uses 
 
 153 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.152(3) (“Whenever a local assessing district fails to have an 
assessment roll prepared as required in this act and it becomes necessary for the commission to assess the 
properties in the district either by its own staff or the county equalization department under direction of 
the commission, the local assessing district shall bear the cost of such assessment and shall reimburse the 
state or county.”). 
 154 See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 2. 
 155 Christine Ferretti, supra note 52. 
 156 Id. 
 157 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2514–15 (2015); see also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 
581, 617–19 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding an obligation to defer to HUD’s disparate impact framework); 
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2017) (discussing the burden-shifting framework). 
 158 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (“[A] plaintiff must begin by 
identifying the specific . . . practice that is challenged.”); HDC, LLC. v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 
613 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[P]laintiff must demonstrate that a facially neutral policy or practice has the effect 
of discriminating against a protected class of which the plaintiff is a member.” (quoting Graoch Assocs. 
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statistical evidence to show the policy adversely or disproportionately 
impacts a protected group, but does not likewise impact a second control 
group.159 The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the “challenged practice 
caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.”160 
Second, even if plaintiffs successfully establish a prima facie case, the 
discriminatory policy may still be lawful if it is supported by a legally 
sufficient justification.161 According to HUD’s regulations, this justification 
exists when “the challenged practice . . . [i]s necessary to achieve one or 
more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the 
respondent . . . [and] [t]hose interests could not be served by another practice 
that has a less discriminatory effect.”162 At this second stage, defendants have 
the burden of proof and must provide evidence to demonstrate that their 
justification is not merely speculative or hypothetical.163 
Third, if defendants satisfy their burden of proving that there is a legally 
sufficient justification, then plaintiffs can still prevail so long as they prove 
that “the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the 
 
# 33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 371 (6th 
Cir.2007))); see also Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (“[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a 
statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that 
disparity. A robust causality requirement ensures that ‘[r]acial imbalance . . . does not, without more, 
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact’ and thus protects defendants from being held liable for 
racial disparities they did not create.” (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 
(1989))); Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 617. 
 159 See Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A] successful 
disparate impact claim involves a comparison between two groups—those affected and those unaffected 
by the facially neutral policy.”); see also Graoch Assocs., 508 F.3d at 371–72 (noting that every housing 
practice that has a disparate impact is not necessarily illegal therefore plaintiff must produce statistical 
evidence to show the landlord’s action had a disparate impact); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of 
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937–38 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part , 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam) (stating 
that statistical analysis supports disparate impact claims); Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., 50 F. Supp. 
3d 300, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 
2000)) (noting that Hargraves held that “allegations of predatory lending concentrated in minority census 
tracts, supported by statistical evidence, adequately plead disparate impact without favorable loans 
outside protected class.”). 
 160 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2017). 
 161 See id. § 100.500(c)(3). 
 162 Id. § 100.500(b)(1)(i)–(ii). 
 163 See id. § 100.500(b)(2) (“A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and 
may not be hypothetical or speculative.”). See generally Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
419 F.3d 729, 742 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding there was nominal evidence to support Housing Authority’s 
claim that the high crime rate justified discriminatory housing practices); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. 
Action Ctr. v. Saint Bernard Par., 641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 574–78 (E.D. La. 2009) (defendant did not present 
enough evidence to show there were discriminatory housing policies that restricted development of 
affordable housing in predominately white areas). 
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challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less 
discriminatory effect.”164 
The three-part burden-shifting framework is required to investigate 
whether Wayne County’s equalization practices violate the FHA. In the first 
step, Wayne County’s equalization practices are facially neutral and 
constitute a cognizable policy rather than a one-time decision.165 To prove 
that this neutral policy disparately impacts African-Americans, plaintiffs can 
offer statistical evidence.166 Indeed, Part IV of this Essay provides strong 
empirical evidence that predominantly African-American cities in Wayne 
County experience unconstitutional tax assessments and tax foreclosure at a 
much greater rate than predominantly white cities. Due to unreliable property 
valuations, Wayne County failed to properly equalize tax assessments and 
this policy of quasi-equalization affected the cities that needed equalization 
the most—those subjecting their residents to systemic unconstitutional 
assessments. 
Once plaintiffs submit evidence establishing that discriminatory 
assessment and equalization practices exist, the analysis moves to the second 
step: the defendant now has the burden of proving that the practices are 
nonetheless lawful because they are supported by a legally sufficient 
justification.167 Wayne County will likely argue that given the poor market 
data available when a significant number of properties in a jurisdiction are 
not calculated according to the state’s standard rules (i.e., they are in 
override), quasi-equalization was the best it could do under these less than 
ideal circumstances. Hence, the policy of quasi-equalization was not an 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier.168 Rather, quasi-equalization 
was necessary to achieve a semblance of uniformity in light of information-
 
 164 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (“If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth 
in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the 
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by 
another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 
(2009) (noting that before rejecting a business justification—or a governmental entity’s analogous public 
interest—a court must determine that a plaintiff has shown that there is “an available alternative . . . 
practice that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs”). 
 165 See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2523 (2015) (“For instance, a plaintiff challenging the decision of a private developer to construct a new 
building in one location rather than another will not easily be able to show this is a policy causing a 
disparate impact because such a one-time decision may not be a policy at all.”). 
 166 See Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 
508 F.3d 366, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
under the FHA a plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of the alleged adverse effect). 
 167 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2013). 
 168 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (“Governmental or private policies are not contrary to the 
disparate-impact requirement unless they are ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.’” (quoting 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971))). 
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based resource constraints.169 Wayne County will be able to prove that this 
justification is not merely speculative or hypothetical.170 Wayne County may 
also argue that its policy of quasi-equalization would not have had a racially 
disparate impact if taxpayers exercised their legal right to appeal when their 
property tax assessments exceeded 50% of their property’s market value. 
The burden-shifting analysis would then progress to the third and final 
part, which is when plaintiffs provide evidence that the legitimate interests 
underpinning the challenged practice could be served by another practice that 
has a less discriminatory effect. In this case, plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving that applying a factor less than one to all residential properties and 
decreasing the assessed values for the entire class would have a less 
discriminatory effect than the policy of quasi-equalization. 
Plaintiffs would do well to allege that Wayne County’s own sales 
studies showed year after year that certain local units were consistently 
assessing their residents in violation of the Michigan Constitution.171 Without 
accurate data, property equalization was impossible. So, the one thing that 
Wayne County could have done was reduce assessed values for the entire 
class of residential property in local units where unconstitutional 
assessments were rampant. This would have promoted uniformity, made 
property tax bills more affordable, and prevented many people from 
forfeiting their homes through tax foreclosure.172 Even though Detroit’s 
mayor openly admitted on several occasions that the city was over-assessing 
Detroit residents and subjecting them to inflated property taxes, Wayne 
County did not apply the factor.173 Applying a factor is not a perfect solution, 
but it may have had a substantially less discriminatory effect than its policy 
of quasi-equalization. Without the factor, between 2011 and 2015, about 
30% of Detroit homes completed the tax foreclosure process. This was not 
only deeply unjust, but also arguably a violation of the FHA. The next 
Section provides the explicit statutory basis of the FHA violation. 
 
 169 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1)–(2) (2017). 
 170 See id. § 100.500(b)(2). 
 171 For records for 2014–2015, see Detroit Open Data, CITY OF DETROIT, https://data.detroitmi.gov 
[https://perma.cc/2W3B-ALMZ] (search “Property and follow “Wayne County Tax Auction” results) 
(data currently unavailable is on file with author). The city’s published file on their open data portal has 
382,051 records. For additional information, see Parcel Map, supra note 9.  
 172 See Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23. 
 173 Christine Ferretti, Property Taxes Going Down for over Half of Detroiters, DETROIT NEWS 
(published Jan. 23, 2017, 11:05 AM; updated Jan. 24, 2017, 9:31 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/ 
story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/01/23/detroit-property-assessments/96946512 
[https://perma.cc/KW7G-4HLD]. 
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C. Analyzing Unconstitutional Tax Assessments Under §§ 3604 and 3605 
of the FHA 
To assess whether unconstitutional tax assessments and quasi-
equalization in Detroit and other predominantly African-American cities in 
Wayne County violated the FHA, § 3604 and § 3605 of the Act are 
determinative. Section 3604 addresses discrimination in the sale or rental of 
housing and other prohibited practices, while § 3605 pertains to 
discrimination in other residential real estate-related transactions.174 More 
directly, § 3604(a) prohibits municipalities from providing services 
differently such that persons are denied dwellings, § 3604(b) prohibits 
discrimination that involves limiting access to municipal services related to 
the sale or rental of a dwelling, and § 3605(a) prohibits discrimination based 
on the availability or performance of appraisals.175 
A violation of § 3604 and § 3605 can occur due to disparate treatment 
or disparate impact.176 Disparate treatment requires plaintiffs to show that the 
discriminatory act was not accidental or neutral, but rather intentional.177 In 
contrast, a disparate impact analysis bypasses intent-based queries to focus 
instead on the policy’s discriminatory effect.178 Although the disparate 
 
 174 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, and 
prohibiting discrimination against any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 
national origin); id. § 3605 (prohibiting discrimination in transactions related to residential real estate 
because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin). 
 175 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 176 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2017) (“The illustrations of unlawful housing discrimination in this part 
may be established by a practice’s discriminatory effect, even if not motivated by discriminatory intent, 
consistent with the standards outlined in § 100.500.”); see also M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F. 
Supp. 2d 538, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“FHA and ECOA claims may be prosecuted on the basis of (i) 
disparate treatment, i.e., that plaintiffs were treated differently because of their membership in a protected 
class, or on the basis of (ii) disparate impact, i.e., that the defendant’s practices have a proportionally 
greater negative impact on minority populations.”); William F. Fuller, Note, What’s HUD Got to Do with 
It?: How HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule May Save the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2047, 2058 (2015) (discussing the difference between purposeful discrimination 
and neutral acts with a discriminatory effect). 
 177 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
 178 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 
(2015) (noting that disparate impact analysis “challenges practices that have a ‘disproportionately adverse 
effect on minorities’ and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale” (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 
557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009))); see also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577; 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (“Liability may be 
established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice’s discriminatory effect, as defined in 
paragraph (a) of this section, even if the practice was not motivated by a discriminatory intent.”). 
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treatment and impact doctrines apply to both sections,179 this Essay’s aim is 
to provide evidence solely of disparate impact.180 
Section II.C.1 below argues that Wayne County’s unconstitutional 
property tax assessments and the associated foreclosures disparately impact 
African-Americans in violation of FHA § 3604(a), which prohibits the denial 
of a dwelling on account of race. Next, Section II.C.2 argues a violation of 
FHA §§ 3604(b) and 3605(a) occurred because local assessors did not 
annually appraise properties, and Wayne County failed to correct the results 
of this misstep through the equalization process. 
1. Dwelling Denied Under § 3604(a) 
Since unconstitutional property tax assessments and property tax 
foreclosures disparately impacted Wayne County’s predominately African-
American cities, Wayne County violated FHA § 3604(a), which states that 
[I]t shall be unlawful . . . to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide 
offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make 
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, 
sex, familial status, or national origin.181 
Subpart B of HUD’s regulations provides a thicker description of what 
constitutes unlawful housing discrimination under § 3604.182 According to 
HUD, § 3604(a) makes it unlawful to “engage in any conduct relating to the 
provision of housing or of services and facilities in connection therewith that 
otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings to persons.”183 HUD has 
stated that prohibited activities include, but are not limited to, 
 
 179 See generally Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 11460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (stating that disparate treatment was the 
primary form of discrimination the act protected against, but HUD formally recognized disparate impact 
liability, which was later codified under FHA § 3604(a) Discrimination in Sale or Rental of Housing and 
Other Prohibited Practices and § 3605(a) Discrimination in Residential Real Estate-Related 
Transactions). 
 180 Because § 3617 of the FHA—dealing with interference, coercion, or intimidation—requires 
disparate treatment, it is not included in this analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful 
to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account 
of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in 
the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this 
title.”); see also East-Miller v. Lake Cty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 563–64 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o 
prevail on a § 3617 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) [s]he is a protected individual under the FHA[], 
(2) [s]he was engaged in the exercise or enjoyment of [her] fair housing rights . . . , (3) Defendants were 
motivated in part by an intent to discriminate, or their conduct produced a disparate impact, and (4) 
Defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered with the Plaintiff on account of [her] protected 
activity under the FHA[].” (alterations in original)). 
 181 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 182 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.50–.90 (2017). 
 183 Id. § 100.70(b). 
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discriminatorily providing municipal services or hazard insurance or failure 
to provide these services at all to members of a protected category.184 Case 
law shows that § 3604(a) reaches both governmental and private conduct 
involving the denial or unavailability of housing.185 
Through the equalization process, Wayne County is legally mandated 
to ensure that each class of “real and personal property in the respective 
townships or cities has been equally and uniformly assessed at true cash 
value.”186 If the county finds there are inequalities, then it “must equalize to 
produce a sum which represents the true cash value of the property.”187 
Equalization is a municipal service related to housing, and Wayne County’s 
failure to do it properly has adversely affected cities where unconstitutional 
tax assessments are pervasive. This study finds that predominantly African-
American cities are subject to unconstitutional tax assessments and 
foreclosure at a greater rate than predominantly white cities. In addition, in 
a forthcoming paper that I coauthored with Professor Christopher Berry, we 
estimate that 10% of all tax foreclosures were caused by illegally inflated tax 
assessments.188 As a result, Wayne County has violated § 3604(a) because 
residents of predominantly African-American cities are disproportionately 
denied dwellings due to the county’s policy of quasi-equalization, which did 
not correct unconstitutional tax assessments in the residential property 
class.189 
 
 184 See id. § 100.70(d)(4) (“Refusing to provide municipal services or property or hazard insurance 
for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently because of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin.”). 
 185 See, e.g., Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(discrimination in charging sewer service rates); Good Shepherd Manor Found. Inc. v. City of Momence, 
323 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 2003) (discriminatory denial of water); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of 
Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 799–800 (6th Cir. 1996) (discriminatory enforcement of zoning laws can make 
housing unavailable in violation of the FHA); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of 
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1974) (denial of water and sewage services, as well as exposure 
to pollutants); Davis v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324, 367–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discriminatory 
provision of police services); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 14, 21–23 (D.D.C. 2010) (applying § 3604(a) to disparities in the allocation of 
post-hurricane recovery funds to current property owners); Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 
2d 456, 463 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (discriminatory denial of sewer services). 
 186 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.34 (1986); see also MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 209.41(6) (2009). 
 187 Allied Supermarkets, Inc v. City of Detroit, 216 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Mich. 1974) (quoting MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 211.34). 
 188 See Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23. 
 189 See Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Wayne Cty. Treasurer, No. 336430, 2017 WL 4182985 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017) (per curiam) (discussing the Plaintiff’s assertions of disparate impact of Wayne 
County’s foreclosure process on African-Americans), appeal denied 905 N.W.2d 597 (Mich. 2018). In 
Morningside v. Sabree, plaintiffs challenged the foreclosures rather than the county’s failure to comply 
with its equalization duty. See Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 6. 
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2. Discriminatory Appraisals Under § 3604(b) and § 3605(a) 
While both § 3604(a) and (b) of the FHA deal with the discriminatory 
provision of services, the primary difference between them is that § 3604(a) 
is concerned with plaintiffs who are denied dwellings, while § 3604(b) 
focuses on the terms of the sale or rental, and the provision of housing related 
services, but does not necessarily involve the denial of a dwelling.190 This 
Section argues that a violation of § 3604(b) and § 3605(a) of the FHA 
occurred because local assessors have failed to annually appraise properties, 
and Wayne County has failed to use the equalization process to correct the 
results of this misstep for the residential property class. 
As discussed above, the Michigan Constitution clearly states that a 
property’s assessed value is not to exceed 50% of the property’s market 
value.191 Each Assessments Division in Michigan is advised to assess 
properties annually and “inspect 20% of properties in their local unit 
annually.”192 The primary cause of unconstitutional tax assessments in 
Wayne County is the local Assessments Division’s failure to properly 
appraise properties annually, as required by law.193 For properties that have 
dropped significantly in value over the years, updated appraisals are even 
more essential.194 
Section 3604(b) states that it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any 
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, 
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because 
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”195 HUD has 
interpreted this provision to mean that it is unlawful “to impose different 
terms, conditions or privileges relating to the sale or rental of a dwelling or 
to deny or limit services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of 
a dwelling.”196 
 
 190 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (“[I]t shall be unlawful—(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making 
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or 
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. (b) 
To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, 
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, or national origin.”). 
 191 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(a)(1). 
 192  MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, supra note 48, at 1 (“As a guideline, the State Tax Commission 
recommends that assessors inspect 20% of properties in their local unit annually.”); see MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 211.10 (1994). 
 193 See Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7. 
 194 See id. at 27 (“Detroit’s assessors are illegally assessing lower-valued properties by a substantial 
margin, while the assessment ratios for higher-valued property are at or even below the constitutionally 
permitted limit of 0.5.”). 
 195 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
 196 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(a) (2017); see also id. § 100.65(b)(4). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1540 
Critics would argue that the appraisals at issue are not performed in 
connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling. But, to determine whether a 
home is affordable, homeowners must know their property tax liability prior 
to initial purchase and occupancy. So, the appraisal behind the property tax 
calculation is directly connected to home sales. Additionally, appraisals are 
indeed a service provided in connection with the sale of a dwelling because 
both Wayne County and its assessment divisions appraise properties by 
analyzing recent sales of comparable properties.197 Wayne County violated 
§ 3604(b) if its own sales studies or appraisals showed unconstitutional 
assessments were rife in predominately African-American cities, but it failed 
to use the equalization process to correct this for the residential property 
class. 
In addition, § 3605(a)—discussing discrimination in residential real 
estate-related transactions beyond sale or rental—states that: 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes 
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against 
any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions 
of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial 
status, or national origin.198 
The term “residential real estate-related transaction” includes “selling, 
brokering, or appraising” residential real estate.199 HUD’s authoritative 
interpretation of § 3605(a) states that it is unlawful for agencies to 
discriminate either in making appraisals available or in the performance of 
appraisal services.200 HUD defines “appraisal” as an “estimate or opinion of 
the value of a specified residential real property made in a business context 
in connection with the sale, rental, financing or refinancing of a dwelling or 
in connection with any activity that otherwise affects the availability of a 
residential real estate-related transaction.”201 Given the centrality of appraisal 
services to the property tax assessment and equalization processes, the 
question for a § 3605(a) analysis becomes whether Wayne County’s 
equalization department is an “entity whose business includes engaging in 
residential real estate-related transactions.”202 
In prior cases, this classification has entailed both quasi-public and 
private agencies, including mortgage lenders, insurance providers, bankers, 
 
 197 See, e.g., Antisdale v. City of Galesburg, 362 N.W.2d 632, 636–37 (Mich. 1984); INT’L ASS’N OF 
ASSESSING OFFICERS, supra note 3, at 9. 
 198 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). 
 199 Id. § 3605(b). 
 200 24 C.F.R.§ 100.135(a). See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 100, § 18.7–.8, at 18-32 to 18-39. 
 201 24 C.F.R.§ § 100.135(b). 
202 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).  
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and a quasi-public agency empowered to issue tax-exempt bonds.203 In Eva 
v. Midwest National Mortgage Bank, Inc., a federal district court decided a 
business that charged a fee for servicing a home loan qualified as an entity 
whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related 
transactions, even though the entity was not directly involved in “the selling, 
brokering, or appraising of residential real property.”204 If a business 
indirectly involved in providing home loans qualifies, then surely a public 
entity that is directly involved in appraising properties will also qualify. 
Although I am aware of no case that examines specifically whether a county 
equalization department or a city’s assessment division qualifies as an entity 
whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related 
transactions, the connection is clear. 
In sum, there is a violation of § 3605(a) and § 3604(b) because African-
Americans are disparately impacted by the failure of certain assessment 
divisions to provide proper appraisal services as required by law, and the 
failure of Wayne County to correct this through the equalization process. 
D. Litigating Unconstitutional Property Tax Assessments Under the FHA 
Lawyers must decide which court to litigate a FHA violation based 
upon discriminatory property tax administration. Due to the Tax Injunction 
Act, plaintiffs cannot litigate an FHA claim in federal courts because they 
are not allowed to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or 
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”205 For instance, in United 
States v. County of Nassau, the court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss because the Act prohibited the United States from challenging the 
county’s discriminatory residential property tax assessment scheme under 
the FHA.206 While it is clear that the Tax Injunction Act requires that 
 
 203 See Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co., 573 F. Supp. 2d 
70 (D.D.C. 2008) (memorandum); Nevels v. W. World Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (W.D. Wash. 
2004); Nat’l Fair Hous. All., Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2002); Eva 
v. Midwest Nat’l Mortg. Banc, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 862, 889 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“The plain language of 
the statute does not, as Defendant USMR contends, require a defendant to be a mortgage lender, banker, 
mortgage arranger or creditor. (Doc. # 38 at 12) To the contrary, the plain language of § 3605 merely 
requires that the entity conduct business which ‘includes engaging in residential real estate-related 
transactions.’ 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (emphasis added). Thus, the entity need not be specifically existing for 
the purpose of engaging in real estate-related transactions; such activity need only be ‘included’ as one 
portion of its overall functioning.”); United States v. Mass. Indus. Fin. Agency, 910 F. Supp. 21 (D. Mass. 
1996); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 100, § 18:1, at 18-3 n.9 and accompanying text. 
 204 See 143 F. Supp. 2d at 881, 89–90 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)). 
 205 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
 206 79 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Therefore, the Court concludes that the instant action 
is not subject to any of the exceptions to the Tax Injunction Act.”). 
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plaintiffs litigate these types of FHA claims in state court, the question in the 
litigation against Detroit and Wayne County is which Michigan court: the 
Michigan Tax Tribunal or Michigan trial court? 
In Morningside, the plaintiffs made a claim against the City of Detroit 
for administering the poverty tax exemption without due process, but the trial 
court dismissed the FHA claim against Wayne County, stating that the claim 
should have been brought to the Michigan Tax Tribunal. Plaintiffs argued 
that the Tax Tribunal was not a court and the FHA states that “[a]n aggrieved 
person may commence a civil action in an appropriate United States district 
court or State court.”207 Even though the Tax Tribunal is not a court, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court.208 Now that the Morningside plaintiffs’ appeal to the Michigan 
Supreme Court has failed, they can refile their case in the Tax Tribunal. This, 
however, presents three important limitations. 
First, the Michigan courts have long recognized that “the rules of the 
Tax Tribunal do not provide for class actions.”209 While a class action affords 
an opportunity to address the structural shortcomings of the assessment and 
equalization processes, the Tax Tribunal only provides relief to individuals. 
Second, the FHA expressly provides that aggrieved persons have one year to 
file a claim with HUD.210 But, under the Tax Tribunal’s procedures, a 
homeowner has just a few weeks to file a claim during the Assessor’s Review 
and then the March Board of Review, which are prerequisites to the Tribunal 
acquiring jurisdiction.211 Third, in Wikman v. City of Novi, the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that “the Tax Tribunal lacks the power to issue an 
injunction” because this is an exercise of judicial power, which the 
legislature cannot transfer to an administrative agency.212 But, the FHA 
authorizes private persons to commence a civil action, and if the court finds 
that discriminatory housing practices have occurred, then the potential 
remedies include actual and punitive damages, a permanent or temporary 
injunction, a temporary restraining order, an order of affirmative action, and 
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.213 So, although the FHA permits 
 
 207 See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). See generally id. §§ 3612–14 (stating 
that there are three entities with the power to enforce a FHA claim: the Secretary of HUD, the U.S. 
Attorney General, and private persons). 
 208 Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Wayne Cty. Treasurer, No. 336430, 2017 WL 4182985, at *1 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017) (per curiam). 
 209 Perry v. Vernon Twp., 404 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Romulus City 
Treasurer v. Wayne Cty. Drain Comm’r, 322 N.W.2d 152, 168 (Mich. 1982) (Levin, J., concurring)). 
 210 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1). 
 211 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.30 (2013). 
 212 322 N.W.2d 103, 114 (Mich. 1982). 
 213 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c). 
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injunctive relief and punitive damages,214 the Tax Tribunal has no power to 
grant this type of relief, leaving plaintiffs at a severe disadvantage.215 
Although the Michigan Court of Appeals decision has the three stated 
downsides, it also may be a blessing in disguise for plaintiffs by giving them 
a way into federal court, which has historically been more sympathetic to 
antidiscrimination claims than Michigan courts.216 The Tax Injunction Act 
will allow a state tax case into federal courts under a few narrow exceptions: 
one being no “plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts 
of such State.”217 By mandating all tax assessment-related cases go to the 
Michigan Tax Tribunal—which cannot hear class actions—plaintiffs can 
only file individual cases. There is no remedy in Michigan courts for 
addressing property tax injustice that is pervasive and routinized. 
In sum, Part II has articulated a comprehensive legal theory supporting 
the claim that Wayne County’s racially discriminatory property tax 
administration is a violation of the FHA. The remainder of the paper 
empirically demonstrates that Wayne County’s tax assessment and 
foreclosure practices disparately impact African-Americans. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Data on property tax assessments, home sales, and race is required to 
empirically investigate the racial impacts of unconstitutional tax assessments 
in Wayne County. While significant data is available, some data are missing. 
For instance, it is possible that both Detroit and Wayne County are violating 
§ 3604 and § 3605 of the FHA. But, to investigate whether unconstitutional 
tax assessments are disparately impacting African-Americans in the City of 
Detroit, I would need to compare assessment ratios for African-Americans 
with those of Whites in the City. This, however, would require data on the 
race of each homeowner in Detroit linked to assessment data, which does not 
exist. What I do have is census data, which provides a full sample of race at 
the block level every ten years, and a smaller sample at the tract level every 
year since 2005.218 But, since over 80% of Detroit’s population is African-
 
 214 Id. 
 215 Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Wayne Cty. Treasurer, No. 336430, 2017 WL 4182985, at *3 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017) (per curiam) (noting that even though the Michigan Tax Tribunal lacked the 
ability to issue injunctions, the remedy sought by the plaintiff, it did not limit the tribunal from having 
exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims regarding the validity of property assessments). 
 216 Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 531, 537 (1989) 
(discussing the preference of federal courts by plaintiffs in federal rights cases). 
 217 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
 218 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/2010census 
[https://perma.cc/TG33-NU8D]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Community Facts, AM. FACTFINDER,  
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml [https://perma.cc/WB5W-
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American,219 there are very few majority white blocks that I can reliably 
compare with majority black blocks.220 Even in the few affluent areas of 
Detroit, Whites live alongside middle and upper-class African-Americans. 
As a result, I cannot accurately examine whether Detroit’s Assessments 
Division is unconstitutionally assessing African-American homeowners in 
Detroit at a greater rate than white homeowners, given the limitations of the 
data. 
But, at the county level, it is possible to differentiate between majority 
African-American and majority white cities because Wayne County—
composed of forty-three municipalities—is starkly stratified by race (see 
Appendix Table 1A). African-Americans constitute the largest racial group 
in Detroit, Inkster, Highland Park, Harper Woods, and River Rouge and form 
a super majority (over 70% of the population) in Detroit, Inkster, and 
Highland Park.221 In contrast, there are thirty-eight municipalities where 
whites compose a majority and thirty-three where they constitute a 
supermajority. There are only four municipalities where African-Americans 
and whites live together in approximately equal numbers (meaning there is 
a population difference of less than 10% between the two groups): River 
Rouge, Harper Woods, Romulus, and Ecorse. For these reasons, this study 
is able to analyze whether Wayne County has violated the FHA by failing to 
use the equalization process to correct pervasive unconstitutional 
assessments that adversely impact predominately African-American cities 
and towns at a significantly greater rate than predominately white ones. 
To determine if assessments in Wayne County violate the FHA, I 
conducted an assessment ratio study (also known as sales ratio study or ratio 
study) because this is the primary mechanism that taxpayers, assessors, 
appeal boards, and taxing authorities use to determine if assessments satisfy 
 
4ADS] (for tract data from 2010, search for Detroit City, Michigan, select Race and Hispanic Origin from 
menu on left, then choose Compare Census Tracts for Race and Hispanic or Latino). 
 219 Race and other demographic information were obtained from the U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2015 
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, AM. FACTFINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/
nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml [https://perma.cc/267N-QYL2] (select American Community Survey “get 
data” hyperlink, and then within the Advanced Search function, input “Wayne County, Michigan” and 
“select results from “2015” to obtain the 2015 ACS 5-year estimates). 
 220 See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011) 
(discussing judicial reliance and preference on quantitative analysis in determining discrimination); 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 191 (2009) (discussing judicial trend of preference for near-identical comparators in discrimination 
cases). 
 221 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 219. 
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the legal requirements of a jurisdiction.222 An assessment ratio study is “a 
form of applied statistics, because the analyst draws conclusions about the 
appraisal of the population (the entire jurisdiction) of properties based only 
on those that have sold during the given time period.”223 If the unsold parcels 
are appraised in the same manner as the sold ones, then it is valid to use the 
statistics derived from the sales ratio study to infer appraisal performance for 
unsold parcels. The evidence shows that homes selling during the period 
under study are comparable to homes that did not sell. For example, average 
year built for all residential properties in Wayne County is 1948, and the 
comparable figure for this study’s sample is 1956. Average building square 
footage for all residential properties in Wayne County is 1,409, and the 
comparable figure for this sample is 1,488. 
Given Michigan’s constitutional requirement that assessments cannot 
exceed 50% of a property’s market value, the overall assessment ratio—
which is a property’s assessed value divided by its market value—should 
have a mean and median no higher than 0.5.224 If the ratios derived are 
consistently higher than 0.5, then this is reliable evidence that, on average, 
assessments are violating the Michigan Constitution. For reasons articulated 
in the prior section, a violation of § 3604 and § 3605 of the FHA has occurred 
if the data show that Wayne County’s predominantly African-American 
cities experience unconstitutional tax assessments and property tax 
foreclosure at a greater rate than its predominately white cities. 
Since assessments in Michigan are calculated annually and are based 
on property values from the previous year, I divided assessed values with 
prior year sales information to produce assessment ratios. More specifically, 
I calculated the annual median assessment ratios for each municipality based 
on residential sale transactions occurring between January 1, 2012, and 
August 27, 2015, and annual records of property assessments for 2013 
through 2016. I secured these data from RealtyTrac—a well-known vendor 
of foreclosure and real-estate transaction records. For properties that were 
sold multiple times in the same calendar year, I took the last sale in a year as 
the determinant of the property’s value. The full dataset includes 272,569 
residential property transactions (I exclude empty lots and nontaxable 




 222 INT’L ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON RATIO STUDIES 7 (2013), 
http://www.iaao.org/media/standards/Standard_on_Ratio_Studies.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZQ3-FUSW] 
[hereinafter STANDARD ON RATIO STUDIES]. 
 223 Id. at 8. 
 224 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3. 
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                               TABLE 1: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY YEAR OF SALE  






  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2012 82,834 10,524 9,826 6.63% 
2013 79,362 11,926 11,474 3.79% 
2014 70,463 6,248 6,078 2.79% 
2015 39,910 6,641 6,433 3.13% 
Total 272,569 35,339 33,811 4.32% 
 
To ensure the most accurate estimates, I restricted the data used in the 
analysis in several ways. First, as required by law, I limited the data 
examined to “arm’s-length transactions,” which exclude transfers between 
related parties, auction sales, and other similar nonmarket transactions.225 
Second, I only included sales using warranty deeds, which is the typical deed 
of transfer for arm’s-length transactions.226 Although the law states that only 
arm’s-length transactions should be examined, there is an exception if 
nonarm’s-length transactions (distressed sales) “have become a common 
method of acquisition in the jurisdiction for the class of property being 
valued.”227 Given that only about 13% of sales from 2012 to 2015 were 
arm’s-length transactions (see Table 1), there is a strong argument that 
distressed sales are, in fact, the common method of acquisition for residential 
properties in certain Wayne County cities and towns. Nevertheless, I include 
only arm’s length transactions in the analysis so that the resulting estimates 
provide the most conservative measure of unconstitutionality. Scholars who 
include distressed sales in their analysis will only find unconstitutionality 
that is markedly more pronounced. Third, I excluded bundled properties—
different parcels with identical sellers, sale dates, and sale prices—because 
it is impossible to determine the price of any single property within the 
bundle. Fourth, I excluded properties that had a sale price of zero because it 
is unlikely that these were arm’s-length transactions. I also excluded 
properties with an assessed value equal to zero because these are likely to be 
nontaxable properties. 
 
 225 RealtyTrac has a proprietary algorithm for identifying arm’s length transactions. 
 226 RICHARD R. POWELL, 14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 81A.03[1](b)(i), at 81A–27 (Michael 
Allan Wolf ed., 2017). 
 227 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(1) (2013). 
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In total, I excluded 87% of the total observations, which may seem 
extreme, but this is a result of the auctions and other non-arm’s-length 
transactions that have proliferated in the distressed real estate markets of 
several of Wayne County’s cities and towns. In addition, I further trimmed 
the data in accordance with International Association of Assessing Officers’ 
(IAAO) nationally recognized standards, which recommend trimming the 
sample of statistical outliers because very low or high ratios can severely 
distort the analysis.228 I show the total observations after trimming in column 
(3) of Table 1, and the percentage of trimmed observations in column (4). 
The number of observations I excluded from the sample due to outlier 
trimming is below the IAAO’s recommended limit of 10%.229 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The data convincingly show that property tax administration in Wayne 
County has led predominately African-American cities and towns to 
experience property tax foreclosures and unconstitutional tax assessments at 
a greater rate than predominately white ones. To demonstrate this, I pose two 
specific research questions: 
The first question is whether the facially neutral property tax 
foreclosure practices in Wayne County have led predominately African-
American cities and towns to experience property tax foreclosures at a 
greater rate than predominately white ones. As shown in Appendix Table 
2A, there are six cities with a property tax foreclosure rate that exceeds 10 
per 1,000 properties: Highland Park (235), Detroit (153), Inkster (46), Ecorse 
(39), River Rouge (16), Hamtramck (13). From this list, Hamtramck is the 
only city where African-Americans do not constitute a significant portion of 
the population—they account for only 13% of residents.230 In the other cities, 
 
 228 STANDARD ON RATIO STUDIES, supra note 222, at 53. The IAAO defines an outlier as an 
assessment ratio below the first quartile or above the third quartile by 1.5 times the interquartile range 
(IQR), where the IQR is the difference between the first and third quartiles. The first quartile is the median 
value of the lower half of the data and the third quartile is the median value of the upper half of the data 
(the second quartile is the median of the entire dataset). The IAAO also recognizes that ratio distributions 
are often skewed to the right (i.e., a greater number of high ratios may be present), so to prevent dropping 
a disproportionate number of high ratios, the IAAO suggests taking the logarithm of each assessment 
ratio prior to trimming the outliers. Id. at 41, 53. Steps I took for trimming outliers: 1) Locate the first 
quartile (i.e., median value of the lower half of the data), 2) Locate the third quartile (i.e., median value 
of the upper half of the data), 3) Compute the interquartile range (IQR) and multiply by 1.5 = (Step 2 – 
Step 1) x 1.5, 4) Establish the Lower Boundary = (Step 1 – Step 3), and 5) Establish the Upper boundary 
= (Step 2 + Step 3). 
 229 Id. at 54. 
 230 It is important to understand that while Hamtramck’s residents are classified as white in the 
census, it is a community dominated by Arab immigrants, many of whom are economically and socially 
vulnerable. Sarah Pulliam Bailey, In the First Majority-Muslim U.S. City, Residents Tense About Its 
Future, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/for-the-first-majority-
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anywhere between 45% to 92% of the population is African-American (see 
Appendix Table 1A). As such, the data clearly show that Wayne County’s 
predominately African-American cities are disparately impacted by property 
tax foreclosures.231  
The second question is whether Wayne County’s failure to properly 
equalize the assessments has caused predominately African-American cities 
and towns to experience unconstitutional tax assessments at a greater rate 
than predominately white ones. According to the Michigan Constitution, the 
assessment ratio for each property cannot exceed 0.50;232 so when the median 
assessment ratio for any municipality is 0.60 and above, it is certain that the 
assessed values in that jurisdiction are systematically violating the Michigan 
Constitution by a significant margin. That is, there is no debate as to whether 
unconstitutional assessments dominate a jurisdiction when the average 
assessment ratio is 0.60.  
As shown in Appendix Table 3A, there are eight municipalities that fall 
within this category (listed in descending order of assessment ratio): Ecorse, 
River Rouge, Inkster, Hamtramck, Detroit, Dearborn, Highland Park, and 
Lincoln Park. Wayne County residents are subject to severely 
unconstitutional assessments in all three municipalities with a supermajority 
of African-Americans and four of the five municipalities where African-
Americans are the majority. Of the thirty-three municipalities where Whites 
compose a supermajority, only two (Dearborn and Lincoln Park) are among 
the municipalities subjecting its residents to routine and severe 
unconstitutional assessments; and only four of the thirty-eight municipalities 






231 Most significantly, my forthcoming study with Professor Berry estimates that 10% of all tax 
foreclosures were caused by illegally inflated tax assessments. See Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23. 
Moreover, since lower priced homes were overassessed at a greater frequency and magnitude than 
higher priced homes, we estimate that 25% of tax foreclosures among homes less than $8,000 in sale 
price were due to unconstitutional property tax assessments. Id.  
 232 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3. 
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Ratio .5 and 
below 
Ratio above 
.5 and below 
.6 
Ratio .6 and 
above 
Total 
0–33% Black 24 8 3 35 
34–66% Black 0 3 2 5 
67–100% Black 0 0 3 3 
Total 24 11 8 43 
 
As shown in Table 2, there are twenty-four municipalities where the 
median assessment ratio is 0.50 or below and every one of these jurisdictions 
is majority white. Again, the evidence is clear: African-Americans are 
disparately impacted by unconstitutional tax assessments occurring in 
Wayne County. 
FIGURE 2: ASSESSMENT RATIOS BY RACIAL POPULATION OF WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES 
 
 
233 For more information on the assessment ratios for each municipality in Wayne 
County stratified by racial population, see infra Appendix Table 4A. 
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 Based on Figure 2, it is clear that there is a correlation between 
jurisdictions that severely unconstitutionally assess their residents and the 
race of those residents. But, there may be factors other than race driving these 
correlations. For instance, counties may be more likely to endure 
unconstitutional assessments if they experience a precipitous drop in housing 
values because their assessment division did not have the capacity to adjust 
market valuations in a timely manner. Consequently, the next step is to 
determine whether the correlation between race and unconstitutional 
assessments persists even after accounting for severe declines in home 
values. To do this, I sorted municipalities into two categories: those that had 
the most severe home price declines between 2005 and 2013 (i.e., they were 
in the bottom quartile) and those that did not.234 During this period, the 
bottom quartile consists of properties that declined 53% or more. 
The municipalities in the bottom quartile, where the decline in home 
prices was particularly severe include: Ecorse, River Rouge, Inkster, 
Hamtramck, Detroit, Lincoln Park, Wayne, Melvindale, Harper Woods, 
Redford, and Taylor. This list includes four of the thirty-three supermajority 
white municipalities; two of the three supermajority African-American 
municipalities; six of the thirty-eight predominately white municipalities; 
and four of the five predominately African-American municipalities. These 
data show that predominately African-American municipalities were 
disparately impacted by severe declines in housing values. In addition, with 
the exception of two (Redford and Taylor, both predominantly white), all 
municipalities that experienced significant declines in housing values had 
median assessment ratios of 0.55 or above. 
But, as shown in Table 3, among the eleven municipalities that 
experienced significant declines in their housing values, only six were 
subject to assessments that substantially violated the Michigan Constitution 
(0.60 or above): River Rouge, Ecorse, Inkster, Hamtramck, Detroit, and 
Lincoln Park. Among the six are two of the three municipalities with a 
supermajority of African-Americans, but only one of the thirty-three 
municipalities where whites constitute a supermajority. Also, only two 
among the six municipalities (Hamtramck and Lincoln Park) have a 
population that is less than 40% African-American. 
 
 234 Using all arm’s-length transactions for each municipality, I calculated the change in the median 
home sale price from 2005 to 2013. 
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TABLE 3: UNCONSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS AMONG MUNICIPALITIES WHERE THERE WAS A 










     
 River Rouge city  1.25 15,000 40% 53% -75% 
 Inkster city  0.82 26,000 21% 74% -73% 
 Harper Woods city  0.57 36,100 40% 55% -69% 
 Detroit city  0.76 24,000 13% 80% -64% 
Population 
Predominantly White 
     
 Ecorse city  1.25 15,000 47% 45% -77% 
 Redford charter 
township  
0.53 50,000 61% 35% -63% 
 Melvindale city  0.58 41,000 73% 16% -62% 
 Hamtramck city  0.81 20,500 55% 14% -62% 
 Wayne city  0.59 53,003 81% 15% -59% 
 Lincoln Park city  0.60 46,000 85% 6% -57% 
 Taylor city  0.50 65,000 77% 16% -54% 
 
In addition, research shows that assessment divisions are more likely to 
incorrectly appraise lower-valued homes, so home value is another factor 
that is correlated with unconstitutional assessments. Accordingly, it is 
possible that instead of race, low home values explain the concentration of 
unconstitutional assessments in certain municipalities. In order to determine 
whether unconstitutional assessments persisted after accounting for home 
prices, I sorted municipalities into two categories: homes valued at or below 
$51,501 (i.e., homes in the bottom quartile of median home sale prices) and 
homes valued above $51,501. In order to simplify the presentation of the 
data, however, I used $50,000 as the threshold for categorizing 
municipalities with low home prices.235 
 
 235 The results were no different when I used $51,501 versus $50,000. 
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TABLE 4: UNCONSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS AMONG MUNICIPALITIES WHERE MEDIAN HOME 










    
 River Rouge city  1.25 15,000 40% 53% 
 Inkster city  0.82 26,000 21% 74% 
 Detroit city  0.76 24,000 13% 80% 
 Highland Park city  0.60 25,748 4% 92% 
 Harper Woods city  0.57 36,100 40% 55% 
Population Predominantly 
White  
    
 Ecorse city  1.25 15,000 47% 45% 
 Hamtramck city  0.81 20,500 55% 14% 
 Lincoln Park city  0.60 46,000 85% 6% 
 Melvindale city  0.58 41,000 73% 16% 
 
The full list of municipalities that have median home prices below 
$50,000 includes nine municipalities: Ecorse, River Rouge, Inkster, 
Hamtramck, Detroit, Highland Park, Lincoln Park, Melvindale, and Harper 
Woods. This list includes five of the five predominately African-American 
municipalities; three of the three municipalities with a supermajority of 
African-Americans; four of the thirty-eight predominately white 
municipalities, and two of the thirty-three municipalities with a 
supermajority of whites (see Table 4). In sum, cities and towns where 
African-Americans predominate are more likely to have median home sale 
prices below $50,000. Also, there is a correlation between cities that have a 
low median home price and unconstitutional assessments because none of 
the nine municipalities with a median home price of $50,000 or below has 
an assessment ratio below 0.55; and seven of nine have a ratio of 0.60 or 
above. Of the seven municipalities that have low median home prices and 
are severely unconstitutionally assessing its residents, only two have a 
population that is below 45% African-American. 
In sum, I have presented strong evidence that cities with a population 
that is predominantly African-American suffer from unconstitutional 
property tax assessments and tax foreclosures at a higher rate than cities that 
are predominately white. But, more than majority-white cities, 
predominately African-American cities have experienced sharp declines in 
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housing values and low homes prices—two factors that are highly correlated 
with an increased incidence of unconstitutional property tax assessments. 
That is, while a statistical disparity between predominately white and black 
cities exists without question, race is not the only factor causing the 
discrepancy. As a consequence, this Essay has not established causation, but 
rather it has established a strong correlation between unconstitutional 
assessments, foreclosure, and race. 
CONCLUSION 
Wayne County’s failure to properly equalize property tax assessments 
between its local taxing units most acutely affects localities where 
assessments are systematically in violation of the Michigan Constitution and 
thus most in need of correction. The evidence presented shows that 
predominately African-American cities in Wayne County experience 
unconstitutional tax assessments and tax foreclosure at a far greater rate than 
predominately white cities. Consequently, Wayne County’s equalization 
policy disparately impacts African-Americans in violation of § 3604 and 
§ 3605 of the FHA. 
I opened this Essay with Mrs. B’s story. Investors purchased her home 
from the Wayne County Property Tax Auction for $500 and have recently 
evicted Mrs. B. So, even if the FHA class action lawsuit had been successful, 
she would not have gotten her house back.236 If, however, a future lawsuit 
forces Wayne County to properly monitor and prevent unconstitutional 
assessments in its taxing jurisdictions, then the real potential winners are 
homeowners in Wayne County’s predominately African-American cities 
who are still in their homes, but vulnerable to tax injustice and foreclosure. 
There should never be anyone who is unconstitutionally assessed and 
foreclosed upon because they were subject to inflated property tax bills that 
they could not afford to pay. What happened to Mrs. B and so many other 
African-Americans in Wayne County should never happen again. 
  
 
 236 See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2012). 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1A: SELECTED POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS FOR WAYNE COUNTY 
MUNICIPALITIES, 2015 
KEY 
1: % White alone 2: % Black alone 
3: Median household 
income 
4: Per capita income 5: Poverty rate 6: Unemployment rate 
7: Owner-occupancy rate 8: Housing vacancy rate 
9: Median value owner-
occupied housing 
Source: 2015 American Community Survey 5-year estimates237 
 
Place 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Allen Park city 93.9 2.0 63007 29066 6.8 7.7 85.2 6.7 95500 
Belleville city 91.7 6.7 45452 24968 16.3 7.7 57.6 12.2 107900 
Brownstown 
charter township 
83.8 7.1 70095 29945 8.7 6.5 77.9 7.6 155900 
Canton charter 
township 
71.7 9.2 83943 35646 5.5 6.6 75.8 5.4 196200 
Dearborn city 90.1 3.7 47375 21535 28.9 9.9 67.3 9.7 105800 
Dearborn Heights 
city 
84.3 8.6 44620 21671 20.1 11.4 74.1 7.3 82500 
Detroit city 13.4 80.1 25764 15038 40.3 24.9 49.4 30.0 42300 
Ecorse city 46.9 44.8 28131 15449 33.1 24.6 57.6 24.0 40400 
Flat Rock city 90.0 7.6 56700 26296 12.7 8.6 74.8 9.5 110100 
Garden City city 94.3 2.3 49862 23560 10.9 9.0 81.5 7.6 80500 
Gibraltar city 95.4 2.2 66477 27539 11.9 10.7 79.4 15.6 99400 
Grosse Ile 
township 
95.7 0.6 93114 45512 3.1 4.3 88.3 5.7 243600 
Grosse Pointe 
city 
92.3 1.0 98578 59949 2.8 6.5 79.2 8.5 263200 
Grosse Pointe 
Farms city 
94.8 2.7 115918 53485 3.8 5.1 97.4 6.3 268500 
Grosse Pointe 
Park city 
85.9 10.2 95179 53249 6.1 5.4 73.8 10.1 291000 
Grosse Pointe 
Woods city 
90.8 4.9 92014 42524 4.6 5.7 87.3 6.2 188300 
 
 237 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 219. 
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Hamtramck city 55.2 14.4 23759 10557 47.3 17.4 48.3 23.4 41900 
Harper Woods 
city 
39.9 54.7 48820 21694 13.5 12.2 62.1 13.6 64800 
Highland Park 
city 
4.0 92.1 17250 14437 49.3 32.0 36.0 33.9 36000 
Huron charter 
township 
92.9 2.9 73000 29323 10.4 9.3 88.1 4.9 163000 
Inkster city 20.7 74.3 30210 15843 34.9 16.8 51.7 16.9 49100 
Lincoln Park city 84.8 6.2 41090 20105 19.9 12.0 69.9 10.5 58700 
Livonia city 91.7 3.6 70125 33082 5.8 6.4 84.4 5.2 156100 
Melvindale city 72.8 15.7 33081 17149 27.1 11.6 60.1 9.0 54300 
Northville city 93.0 0.7 86397 64841 9.1 9.3 60.7 9.7 313000 
Northville 
township 
78.8 3.3 102964 54552 3.2 4.2 76.4 5.6 341800 
Plymouth city 92.8 2.1 75949 43316 5.9 4.7 60.9 7.6 224300 
Plymouth charter 
township 
91.7 2.0 77248 42184 4.8 4.9 81.5 4.4 249400 
Redford charter 
township 
60.8 34.5 49816 22887 16.5 12.9 76.8 8.6 63600 
River Rouge city 40.1 53.0 26230 14360 41.4 26.0 57.1 27.6 34100 
Riverview city 91.1 5.7 49796 26078 13.4 7.1 62.7 6.8 117200 
Rockwood city 93.7 0.3 51250 28078 9.5 7.5 69.0 8.2 112600 
Romulus city 49.3 42.6 42681 19270 20.5 15.3 64.6 9.1 69400 
Southgate city 87.6 5.5 50280 26042 11.1 9.2 63.9 7.0 84900 
Sumpter 
township 
87.7 9.2 53153 26015 22.0 7.9 88.5 12.3 123800 
Taylor city 76.7 16.5 40545 20351 21.9 14.4 65.5 8.4 72500 
Trenton city 95.5 2.1 55218 29098 8.0 5.7 79.0 4.7 118000 
Van Buren 
charter township 
65.2 28.7 55309 28652 11.3 8.7 65.1 9.7 124400 
Village of Grosse 
Pointe Shores 
city 
94.3 1.1 139954 86153 1.4 4.6 92.5 5.4 410300 
Wayne city 80.6 15.3 39352 20030 22.8 10.1 56.6 10.9 64700 
Westland city 73.5 18.9 44641 24831 15.8 9.2 59.6 8.3 90900 
Woodhaven city 90.7 4.4 55266 30201 6.5 8.4 70.7 6.0 131000 
Wyandotte city 95.2 1.1 51237 27219 11.1 10.3 73.1 9.6 84800 
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TABLE 2A: RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX FORECLOSURE RATE BY WAYNE COUNTY 






(per 1,000 properties) 
Allen Park city 4 11,420 0.35 
Belleville city 1 920 1.09 
Brownstown charter 
township 
2 9,313 0.21 
Dearborn Heights city 41 21,805 1.88 
Detroit city 34,470 224,940 153.24 
Ecorse city 123 3,141 39.16 
Garden City city 17 10,757 1.58 
Gibraltar city 1 1,443 0.69 
Grosse Pointe Woods city 4 6,468 0.62 
Hamtramck city 11 824 13.35 
Harper Woods city 8 3,469 2.31 
Highland Park city 668 2,840 235.21 
Huron charter township 1 3,465 0.29 
Inkster city 208 4,557 45.64 
Lincoln Park city 106 14,042 7.55 
Livonia city 8 34,323 0.23 
Melvindale city 19 3,637 5.22 
Plymouth charter township 1 9,547 0.10 
Redford charter township 39 19,576 1.99 
River Rouge city 35 2,196 15.94 
Riverview city 3 3,637 0.82 
Romulus city 27 6,820 3.96 
Southgate city 13 10,036 1.30 
Sumpter township 3 2,486 1.21 
Taylor city 5 1,546 3.23 
Trenton city 2 5,932 0.34 
Van Buren charter 
township 
3 6,533 0.46 
Wayne city 17 5,288 3.21 
Westland city 43 25,728 1.67 
Wyandotte city 3 3,654 0.82 
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TABLE 3A: ASSESSMENT RATIO DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPALITY 
AND YEAR 





% > 0.50 N 
Allen Park city 
2013 0.51 75,000 0.50 252 
2014 0.47 85,950 0.36 332 
2015 0.47 95,030 0.39 186 
2016 0.45 102,500 0.31 183 
Overall 0.48 87,900 0.39 953 
Belleville city 
2013 0.49 113,900 0.47 17 
2014 0.55 114,750 0.62 24 
2015 0.53 149,000 0.60 15 
2016 0.48 121,500 0.35 26 
Overall 0.50 116,500 0.50 82 
Brownstown charter 
township 
2013 0.50 155,000 0.46 197 
2014 0.50 169,500 0.34 193 
2015 0.50 169,000 0.49 111 
2016 0.50 171,250 0.32 118 
Overall 0.50 165,000 0.40 619 
Canton charter 
township 
2013 0.49 199,900 0.38 617 
2014 0.46 219,000 0.21 751 
2015 0.47 220,000 0.26 355 
2016 0.49 224,700 0.40 395 
Overall 0.48 215,000 0.30 2,118 
Dearborn Heights city 
2013 0.67 63,050 0.84 600 
2014 0.56 74,250 0.64 711 
2015 0.50 85,500 0.50 357 
2016 0.52 83,500 0.54 410 
Overall 0.56 73,000 0.65 2,078 
Dearborn city 
2013 0.86 42,500 0.89 18 
2014 0.62 75,000 0.83 12 
2015 0.68 58,500 1.00 6 
2016 0.71 50,000 0.80 5 
Overall 0.71 50,000 0.88 41 
Detroit city 2013 1.07 18,000 0.83 3,015 
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2014 0.80 25,000 0.76 3,248 
2015 0.57 26,000 0.55 1,861 
2016 0.51 29,000 0.50 1,608 
Overall 0.76 24,000 0.70 9,732 
Ecorse city 
2013 1.90 12,000 0.96 27 
2014 1.67 12,200 1.00 27 
2015 0.92 15,900 0.81 16 
2016 0.68 20,000 0.58 24 
Overall 1.25 15,000 0.85 94 
Flat Rock city 
2013 0.54 145,000 0.60 53 
2014 0.51 107,465 0.52 67 
2015 0.51 117,750 0.54 46 
2016 0.48 140,500 0.40 30 
Overall 0.51 120,000 0.53 196 
Garden City city 
2013 0.58 56,750 0.64 238 
2014 0.50 70,317 0.49 283 
2015 0.48 79,250 0.41 132 
2016 0.47 84,000 0.39 187 
Overall 0.50 70,500 0.50 840 
Gibraltar city 
2013 0.47 170,000 0.40 25 
2014 0.51 170,000 0.51 35 
2015 0.50 101,200 0.45 20 
2016 0.49 140,717 0.48 23 
Overall 0.49 140,717 0.47 103 
Grosse Ile township 
2013 0.53 212,000 0.55 115 
2014 0.50 223,500 0.48 126 
2015 0.49 235,750 0.42 84 
2016 0.49 232,500 0.35 77 
Overall 0.50 228,000 0.46 402 
Grosse Pointe Farms 
city 
2013 0.50 207,500 0.49 151 
2014 0.45 260,000 0.32 185 
2015 0.45 280,000 0.30 91 
2016 0.48 305,000 0.41 100 
Overall 0.48 255,000 0.38 527 
Grosse Pointe Park city 2013 0.54 259,000 0.66 131 
112:1501 (2018) "Our Taxes Are Too Damn High" 
1559 
2014 0.50 230,000 0.47 161 
2015 0.51 267,500 0.51 82 
2016 0.49 260,000 0.45 89 
Overall 0.52 250,000 0.53 463 
Grosse Pointe Woods 
city 
2013 0.51 149,500 0.54 200 
2014 0.45 165,000 0.30 230 
2015 0.48 172,750 0.39 124 
2016 0.49 187,250 0.45 133 
Overall 0.48 165,000 0.41 687 
Grosse Pointe city 
2013 0.49 207,000 0.46 71 
2014 0.46 265,000 0.38 76 
2015 0.50 283,750 0.42 52 
2016 0.49 237,000 0.41 37 
Overall 0.48 237,450 0.42 236 
Hamtramck city 
2013 1.23 14,500 0.85 20 
2014 0.80 20,000 0.95 21 
2015 0.73 29,900 0.69 13 
2016 0.74 27,000 0.75 12 
Overall 0.80 20,500 0.83 66 
Harper Woods city 
2013 0.67 28,750 0.76 124 
2014 0.59 34,750 0.66 148 
2015 0.53 45,000 0.57 83 
2016 0.52 42,000 0.55 119 
Overall 0.57 36,100 0.64 474 
Highland Park city 
2013 2.60 6,950 0.86 14 
2014 0.45 45,000 0.43 37 
2015 0.36 49,900 0.25 8 
2016 0.53 46,500 0.57 7 
Overall 0.60 25,748 0.52 66 
Huron charter township 
2013 0.52 151,000 0.63 43 
2014 0.48 145,000 0.44 71 
2015 0.49 165,000 0.44 25 
2016 0.51 159,950 0.53 38 
Overall 0.51 155,000 0.50 177 
Inkster city 2013 1.60 18,000 0.96 79 
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2014 0.95 24,000 0.91 95 
2015 0.65 31,500 0.70 86 
2016 0.36 47,250 0.33 79 
Overall 0.82 26,000 0.73 339 
Lincoln Park city 
2013 0.79 37,000 0.88 252 
2014 0.59 46,100 0.67 297 
2015 0.56 49,000 0.61 176 
2016 0.48 58,000 0.45 219 
Overall 0.60 46,000 0.66 944 
Livonia city 
2013 0.49 133,250 0.37 726 
2014 0.48 145,500 0.24 873 
2015 0.48 152,000 0.33 397 
2016 0.49 165,000 0.37 508 
Overall 0.49 148,000 0.32 2,504 
Melvindale city 
2013 0.76 31,500 0.88 60 
2014 0.57 38,000 0.61 61 
2015 0.53 45,000 0.55 33 
2016 0.48 50,700 0.44 52 
Overall 0.58 41,000 0.64 206 
Northville city 
2013 0.47 225,000 0.30 44 
2014 0.44 262,500 0.32 38 
2015 0.46 309,500 0.31 16 
2016 0.49 387,500 0.46 26 
Overall 0.46 289,500 0.34 124 
Northville township 
2013 0.49 436,000 0.33 252 
2014 0.48 450,000 0.27 285 
2015 0.48 525,500 0.28 105 
2016 0.50 447,950 0.43 124 
Overall 0.48 450,000 0.31 766 
Plymouth charter 
township 
2013 0.48 215,000 0.37 277 
2014 0.46 280,000 0.22 349 
2015 0.49 295,500 0.39 180 
2016 0.50 250,000 0.48 187 
Overall 0.48 252,500 0.34 993 
Plymouth city 2013 0.48 170,000 0.38 127 
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2014 0.46 220,000 0.29 159 
2015 0.47 222,500 0.34 71 
2016 0.50 259,900 0.42 73 
Overall 0.47 215,000 0.35 430 
Redford charter 
township 
2013 0.63 40,000 0.72 562 
2014 0.53 48,000 0.56 657 
2015 0.49 56,000 0.47 357 
2016 0.46 63,750 0.39 371 
Overall 0.53 50,000 0.56 1,947 
River Rouge city 
2013 1.87 9,300 1.00 20 
2014 1.16 15,000 0.90 20 
2015 0.94 16,500 0.93 14 
2016 0.41 37,125 0.40 10 
Overall 1.25 15,000 0.86 64 
Riverview city 
2013 0.53 100,000 0.59 75 
2014 0.45 138,500 0.30 88 
2015 0.52 146,000 0.62 34 
2016 0.49 118,500 0.46 50 
Overall 0.49 120,000 0.46 247 
Rockwood city 
2013 0.52 82,600 0.56 27 
2014 0.48 97,500 0.41 22 
2015 0.48 113,000 0.42 12 
2016 0.50 102,500 0.44 9 
Overall 0.50 97,000 0.47 70 
Romulus city 
2013 0.62 59,450 0.75 114 
2014 0.55 61,000 0.58 133 
2015 0.51 72,500 0.51 77 
2016 0.50 73,000 0.47 90 
Overall 0.54 65,000 0.59 414 
Southgate city 
2013 0.55 69,900 0.59 208 
2014 0.51 78,050 0.54 294 
2015 0.50 82,500 0.49 134 
2016 0.49 84,550 0.46 158 
Overall 0.51 78,700 0.53 794 
Sumpter township 2013 0.54 110,000 0.58 31 
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2014 0.52 129,375 0.56 43 
2015 0.53 155,000 0.71 14 
2016 0.45 167,500 0.40 15 
Overall 0.52 137,000 0.56 103 
Taylor city 
2013 0.58 60,000 0.62 26 
2014 0.55 62,000 0.55 40 
2015 0.48 84,750 0.38 24 
2016 0.46 84,500 0.35 26 
Overall 0.50 65,000 0.48 116 
Trenton city 
2013 0.54 110,000 0.65 107 
2014 0.47 125,000 0.32 146 
2015 0.47 134,950 0.33 72 
2016 0.51 127,250 0.53 106 
Overall 0.49 123,500 0.46 431 
Van Buren charter 
township 
2013 0.51 155,000 0.54 126 
2014 0.46 170,500 0.33 148 
2015 0.49 193,000 0.35 77 
2016 0.51 180,500 0.51 80 
Overall 0.49 173,450 0.43 431 
Village of Grosse 
Pointe Shores city 
2013 0.50 380,000 0.48 29 
2014 0.47 380,000 0.37 35 
2015 0.47 432,000 0.47 17 
2016 0.48 432,500 0.42 19 
Overall 0.48 395,000 0.43 100 
Wayne city 
2013 0.83 39,000 0.90 93 
2014 0.62 49,950 0.69 132 
2015 0.56 59,250 0.61 70 
2016 0.46 64,000 0.37 79 
Overall 0.59 53,003 0.66 374 
Westland city 
2013 0.54 69,000 0.61 516 
2014 0.48 84,000 0.41 628 
2015 0.48 87,700 0.40 349 
2016 0.48 103,400 0.38 421 
Overall 0.49 83,500 0.46 1,914 
Woodhaven city 2013 0.47 129,900 0.30 60 
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2014 0.46 134,000 0.33 75 
2015 0.47 147,500 0.30 44 
2016 0.48 150,000 0.33 55 
Overall 0.47 139,700 0.32 234 
Wyandotte city 
2013 0.53 66,000 0.61 87 
2014 0.51 82,200 0.52 118 
2015 0.46 76,500 0.38 52 
2016 0.48 94,000 0.40 55 
Overall 0.50 76,500 0.50 312 
 
TABLE 4A: ASSESSMENT RATIO AND RACIAL POPULATION FOR WAYNE COUNTY 
MUNICIPALITIES 
Place % White % Black Ratio 
Allen Park city 93.9 2.0 .48 
Belleville city 91.7 6.7 .5 
Brownstown charter township 83.8 7.1 .5 
Canton charter township 71.7 9.2 .48 
Dearborn city 90.1 3.7 .56 
Dearborn Heights city 84.3 8.6 .71 
Detroit city 13.4 80.1 .76 
Ecorse city 46.9 44.8 1.25 
Flat Rock city 90.0 7.6 .51 
Garden City city 94.3 2.3 .5 
Gibraltar city 95.4 2.2 .49 
Grosse Ile township 95.7 0.6 .5 
Grosse Pointe city 92.3 1.0 .48 
Grosse Pointe Farms city 94.8 2.7 .48 
Grosse Pointe Park city 85.9 10.2 .52 
Grosse Pointe Woods city 90.8 4.9 .48 
Hamtramck city 55.2 14.4 .8 
Harper Woods city 39.9 54.7 .57 
Highland Park city 4.0 92.1 .6 
Huron charter township 92.9 2.9 .51 
Inkster city 20.7 74.3 .82 
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Lincoln Park city 84.8 6.2 .6 
Livonia city 91.7 3.6 .49 
Melvindale city 72.8 15.7 .58 
Northville city 93.0 0.7 .46 
Northville township 78.8 3.3 .48 
Plymouth city 92.8 2.1 .48 
Plymouth charter township 91.7 2.0 .47 
Redford charter township 60.8 34.5 .53 
River Rouge city 40.1 53.0 1.25 
Riverview city 91.1 5.7 .49 
Rockwood city 93.7 0.3 .5 
Romulus city 49.3 42.6 .54 
Southgate city 87.6 5.5 .51 
Sumpter township 87.7 9.2 .52 
Taylor city 76.7 16.5 .5 
Trenton city 95.5 2.1 .49 
Van Buren charter township 65.2 28.7 .49 
Village of Grosse Pointe Shores city 94.3 1.1 .48 
Wayne city 80.6 15.3 .59 
Westland city 73.5 18.9 .49 
Woodhaven city 90.7 4.4 .47 
Wyandotte city 95.2 1.1 .50 
 
 
